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ABSTRACT 
The treatment of foreign trade has a great influence on 
tne results that can be obtained from multisectoral macro- 
economic models. This manifests itself clearly in the problem 
of overspecialized solutions whicharises in most of the models 
currently in use. This unwanted phenomenon is treated dif- 
ferently in the two main classes of models: programming models 
and general equilibrium models. 
This paper discusses the theoretical and methodological 
problems related to this issue using a special comparative 
framework (laissez-faire equilibrium and planner's optimum) . 
Attention is focussed on alternative export specifications and 
optimum tariff problems. The argument is illustrated by numerical 
results based on two models of the Hungarian economy. 
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FOREIGN TRADE I N  MACROECONOMIC MODELS: 
EQUILIBRIUM, OPTIMUM, AND TARIFFS 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
M u l t i s e c t o r a l  p lanning  o r  f o r e c a s t i n g  models f a l l  roughly i n t o  
t h r e e  main c l a s s e s :  input -ou tpu t  models, mathematical  program- 
ming models, and g e n e r a l  equ i l i b r ium models. I n  t h i s  paper  w e  
cons ide r  on ly  models t y p i c a l  of t h e  second and t h i r d  c l a s s e s ,  
paying p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  of f o r e i g n  t r a d e  
i n  t h e s e  models. 
The most impor tan t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  two modeling 
approaches examined h e r e  may be summarized a s  fo l lows .  Mathe- 
matical programming models a r e  t y p i c a l l y  l a r g e - s c a l e  and l i n e a r ,  
con ta in ing  mainly r e a l  ( p h y s i c a l )  v a r i a b l e s  ; most of t h e  r e l a -  
t i o n s  a r e  i n  t h e  form of i n e q u a l i t i e s  (ba lances  and s p e c i a l  
r e s t r i c t i o n s )  and a s  a r u l e  they  c o n t a i n  q u i t e  a  few i n d i v i d u a l  
bounds on v a r i a b l e s .  Computable general equilibrium models, on 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, a r e  s p e c i f i e d  i n  terms of b o t h  r e a l  and p r i c e  
(va lue )  v a r i a b l e s ;  t hey  t y p i c a l l y  t a k e  t h e  form of an equa t ion  
system and i n c l u d e  many n o n l i n e a r  terms; no e x p l i c i t  o v e r a l l  
op t imiza t ion  is c a l l e d  f o r .  
Computable g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  models have many s i m i l a r i t i e s  
t o  t h e  op t imal  p lanning  models used i n  s o c i a l i s t  ( c e n t r a l l y  
planned) economies. However, d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  terminology,  and 
conceptual and o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  have l e d  t o  t h e  impression t h a t  
these  two schools  of macroeconomic modeling d iverge  r a t h e r  than 
converge. I n  e a r l i e r  papers ( s e e ,  Za la i  1980, 1981 ) ,  t h e  au thor  
has argued t h a t  computable gene ra l  equ i l ib r ium models can be 
d iscussed  i n  pure ly  pragmatic terms a s  n a t u r a l  ex tens ions  of a  
c e r t a i n  c l a s s  of programming models. D i spe l l ing  t h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  
myth surrounding equ i l ib r ium models would have two important  con- 
sequences. F i r s t l y ,  it would al low c e n t r a l  planning modelers t o  
t ake  advantage of some of t h e  s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e s  of t h i s  macroecon- 
omic modeling approach ( see  t h e  papers  c i t e d  above f o r  more de- 
t a i l s ) .  Secondly, some of t h e  weaknesses of computable gene ra l  
equi l ibr ium models could be revea led  and e l iminated  by examining 
them from a l i n e a r  programming pe r spec t ive .  
The i d e a s  presented  i n  t h i s  paper can be considered a s  a  
cont inuat ion  of t h e  argument developed i n  t h e  papers  quoted 
above. Thus, t h e  whole d i scuss ion  w i l l  t ake  p lace  wi th in  a  spe- 
c i a l  comparative framework. P a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  be pa id  
t o  t h e  r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of some of t h e  elements usua l ly  included 
i n  models, even though t h i s  means t h a t  w e  must cover some ground 
t h a t  w i l l  be very f a m i l i a r  t o  most r eade r s .  One should warn t h e  
more t h e o r e t i c a l l y  i n c l i n e d  reade r  t o  s k i p  t h e s e  s e c t i o n s  which 
w i l l  hopeful ly  g ive  some new i n s i g h t s  though f o r  a c t u a l  model 
b u i l d e r s .  
This paper i s  b a s i c a l l y  corLcerned with t h e  concepts  of 
"equi l ibr ium" and "optimum" i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  export-import spe- 
c i f i c a t i o n  i n  macroeconomic models. I n  s e c t i o n s  2 and 3 we 
s t a r t  by d i scuss ing  t h e  problem of o v e r s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  and pos- 
s i b l e  methods of dea l ing  with it i n  ( l i n e a r )  programming models 
a s  compared with computable gene ra l  equi l ibr ium models. The 
r o o t  of t h e  problem is  t h a t  most models adopt t h e  usua l  d e f i n i t i o n  
of small  open economy, which implies  t h a t  it cannot in f luence  
i t s  terms of t r ade .  However, it i s  g e n e r a l l y  recognized t h a t  such 
exogenously f i x e d  terms of t r a d e  tend t o  produce ove r spec ia l i zed  
so lu t ions in themacroeconomicmodels  c u r r e n t l y i n u s e  ( s e e ,  f o r  example, 
Taylor1974 andBergman1982). Overspec ia l i za t ionmani fes t s  i t s e l f  
i n t h e e x i s t a n c e o f  only a  small  numberof producing and/orexpor t ing  
s e c t o r s  and l i t t l e  o r  no i n t r a s e c t o r a l  t r a d e .  I n  view of t h e  f a c t  
that, even in the most detailed macroeconomic models, the sec- 
tors represent product groups, such overspecialized solutions 
cannot be defended on practical grounds. Thus, model builders 
must find ways of avoiding unrealistic solutions of this type. 
Builders of macroeconomic models can basically use two 
"pure" methods to prevent overspecialized solutions. One, char- 
acteristic of linear programming models, is to make wide use of 
special bounds on certain groups of variables. Various opinions 
on this subject have been expressed in the literature, some of 
them rather critical of this approach. The other method, origi- 
nally characteristic of computable general equilibrium models, 
is to use various nonlinear export-import relationships. The 
main aim of Sections 2 and 3 is to show that the difference be- 
tween these two approaches can be viewed as one between rigid 
(fixed) and f z e x i b l e  bounds. It is argued that it would be 
natural and useful to include such flexible bounds in existing 
programming-planning models. This viewpoint has much in common 
with recent suggestions made by Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck (1981). 
These sections also provide a basis for discussion of a num- 
ber of other points. For example, we argue that it is necessary 
to make a clear distinction between export restrictions caused 
by supply, on the one hand, and export demand limitations, on 
the other. In the computable general equilibrium models currently 
in use, these two effects are not separated. A related issue is 
that a small response to changes in relative prices is generally 
modeled by very small export demand elasticities, which introduce 
virtually indefensible terms of trade effects into the models. 
These problems call for a revision of common modeling practice 
in this field. 
Section 4 is devoted to related issues in economic theory. 
The theoretical definition of small economies is incompatible 
with the assumption of less than perfectly elastic export demand. 
This definition, on the other hand, is clearly unsatisfactory 
since, due to market and product differentiation, even small 
countries generally face changing terms of trade. Thus, the 
theoretical "small economy" is in practice a completely uninter- 
esting case. This fact has been realized belatedly by model 
b u i l d e r s  and,  a s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  use of l e s s  than  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  
expor t  a s  w e l l  a s  import  demand f u n c t i o n s  i s  now q u i t e  common, 
even i n  models o r i g i n a l l y  developed f o r  s m a l l  open economies. 
The t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  g iven  a s  Armington's  
(1969) assumption of r e g i o n a l  product  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  
I t  i s  w e l l  known i n  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  on i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  t r a d e  t h a t  i f  an  economy f a c e s  l e s s  t han  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  
expor t  demand then  t h e  pu re  compet i t ive  ( l a i s s e z - f a i r e )  e q u i l i b -  
rium i s  n o t  (Pa re to )  opt imal*.  Under s p e c i a l  assumptions ,  o p t i -  
mum t a r i f f s  can  be employed t o  produce t h e  op t imal  t r a d e  p a t t e r n  
i n  an o the rwi se  compe t i t i ve  s e t t i n g .  S t r ange ly  enough, t h i s  
problem does n o t  seem t o  have been cons idered  a t  a l l  i n  connec- 
t i o n  wi th  computable ( a p p l i e d )  gene ra l  equ i l i b r ium models, a l -  
though it a r r i s e s  n a t u r a l l y  i n  our  comparative e x e r c i s e .  W e  
argue t h a t  t h e  modelers f a c e  a  r e a l  cho ice  h e r e  and show t h a t  
b a s i c a l l y  t h e  same model framework and s o l u t i o n  a lgo r i t hm can be 
used t o  determine bo th  s o l u t i o n s .  S e c t i o n  5 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  
theory  us ing  numerical  examples based on a  model of t h e  Hungarian 
economy, c o n c e n t r a t i n g  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  on t h e  p o s s i b l e  magnitude 
of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  compet i t ive  and op t imal  s o l u t i o n s .  
I t  i s  shown t h a t ,  a s  might be  expec ted ,  more f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i s  
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  home economy (al though t h i s  seems 
t o  c o n t r a d i c t  some c l a s s i c a l  economic b e l i e f s ) .  
Going back t o  S e c t i o n  4 ,  w e  extend t h e  c l a s s i c a l  optimum 
t a r i f f  theorem t o  c w e r  smal l  economies, i . e . ,  t h o s e  f a c i n g  con- 
s t a n t  terms of t r a d e .  By moving away s l i g h t l y  from s t r i c t  neo- 
c l a s s i c a l  assumptions,  it can be shown t h a t  less than  p e r f e c t l y  
e l a s t i c  e x p o r t  supply may a l s o  r e s u l t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  e q u i l i b r i u m  
and optimum s o l u t i o n s .  An i n t e r e s t i n g  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  
two optimum t a r i f f  s i t u a t i o n s  i s  t h a t  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e  e x p o r t  
s u p p l i e r s  might have t o  be subs id i zed  r a t h e r  than  taxed i n  o r d e r  
t o  o b t a i n  t h e  op t imal  regime ( i n  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  c a s e  on ly  t a x a t i o n  
i s  p o s s i b l e ) .  
- - 
*See, f o r  example, D i x i t  and Norman (1980) .  See a l s o  
S r i n i v a s a n  (1982) f o r  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h i s  separa-  
t i o n  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e x t .  
Finally, as already mentioned, Section 5 provides some 
numerical illustrations of the theoretical arguments and sums 
up the main conclusions for practical model building. 
2. FOREIGN TRADE IN LINEAR MULTISECTORfLL PLANNING MODELS 
2.1. On the Use of Individual Bounds 
In this section we will review, discuss, and illustrate 
the problem of overspecialization with regard to linear program- 
ming models. Whether we consider development planning models 
following neoclassical traditions or more pragmatic planning 
models based on traditional plan calculations, one of the most 
common means* of preventing extreme behavior is to impose upper 
and/or lower bounds on different variables, particularly on pro- 
duction, export, and import variables. 
The use of individual bounds in planning models in not uni- 
versally approved. One of the main criticisms is that they 
are ad hoe arbitrary restrictions, which can also distort the 
shadow prices (see, for example, Taylor 1975, or Ginsburgh and 
Waelbroeck 1983). An alternative approach favored by some model 
builders involves the introduction of more complicated nonlinear 
relationships into the model, perhaps in a piecewise linear 
fashion. We will come back to this possibility later. 
The above criticism is, however, only partially justified. 
On the one hand, it is undoubtedly true that the individual con- 
strains account for the inadequacy of the chosen model, reflect- 
ing our lack of knowledge and modeling ability. On the other 
hand, however, this problem, i.e., the arbitrariness of certain 
elements, is common to all present economic models. In some 
models this is quite apparent, while in others it is partially 
hidden behind an elegant mathematical facade. Thus, for example, 
the use of nonlinear relationships(.rather than individual bounds) 
to deal with overspecialization can just be seen as introducing 
another type of arbitrariness into the model. Moreover, for 
plan coordination models at least, most of the individual bounds 
*See Taylor (1975) for a more complete treatment of alter- 
native ways of handling these problems. 
are based on partial, presumably rather careful analysis of the 
underlying phenomena in the traditional planning process; it is 
doubtful that this expertise could be replaced by some simple 
modeling device. 
To avoid this argument becoming one-sided, we must make a 
brief mention of some points which will be discussed in more 
detail in later sections. It could be argued that the real 
choice is not between expert judgement and individual bounds, 
on the one hand, and nonlinear, econometrically estimated re- 
lationships, on the other. The parameters of the nonlinear 
forms in question could just as well be based on expert judge- 
ment as are the individual bounds in the other solution. Both 
solutions are capable of providing planners with equally real- 
istic descriptions of patterns of resource allocation. 
What is more important, in our view, is the fact that the 
use of nonlinear relationships may result in macroeconomic 
models that are able to produce less distorted accounting 
(shadow) prices, which, in turn, may be a useful source of in- 
formation for price and cost planning, or project evaluation. 
In what follows we will try to show that these nonlinear 
functions can, in most cases, be viewed as f Z e x i b Z e  bounds on 
certain variables. The main purpose of this and the next sec- 
tion is to show that a large class of the multisectoral comput- 
able general equilibrium models can be seen as programming 
models with such flexible bounds. At the same time, through 
an illustrative example, we will point out some of the defi- 
ciencies of shadow prices and post-optimization analysis in the 
case of linear models. 
2.2. A Simple Model with Bounded Export: Rigid Versus Flexible 
Bounds 
We shall open the discussion by considering a simple exam- 
ple, concentrating our attention on the treatment of foreign 
trade. For the sake of simplicity we will use an extremely 
stylized, textbook type of model. We will assume that there is 
only one sector whose net output (Y) is given (determined by 
available resources). The only allocation problem is to divide 
- 
Y i n t o  domestic use  ( C d )  and expor t s  ( 2 ) .  Exported goods w i l l  
be exchanged f o r  an imported commodity which i s  assumed t o  be 
a per 'fect  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  home commodity. In te rmedia te  use 
w i l l  be neglec ted .  
Following t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i n e a r  programming approach, ex- 
p o r t  (FE) and import (FM) p r i c e s  w i l l  be t r e a t e d  a s  (exogenously 
given)  parameters of t h e  model. In t roducing  M f o r  t h e  amount 
of imports purchased and Cm f o r  t h e  amount of imports used,  our  
opt imal  resource  a l l o c a t i o n  problem can be formulated i n  t h e  
fol lowing simple way 
C = Cd + Cm + max 
where Pd,  Pm, and V a r e  t h e  dua l  v a r i a b l e s  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t s ,  i . e . ,  t h e  shadow p r i c e s  of domestic ou tpu t ,  i m -  
p o r t s ,  and f o r e i g n  currency,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The s o l u t i o n  of t h e  above problem obviously depends only on t h e  
- 
r e l a t i o n  of FE and PM, i . e . ,  on t h e  terms of t r a d e .  The prob- 
lem of o v e r s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  here  very c l e a r l y .  I f  
t h e  terms of t r a d e  a r e  f avorab le  (FE > P ) then eve ry th ing  w i l l  
- 
M 
be exported ( Z  = Y )  and only imported goods consumed (Cd  = 0 ,  
- 
- 
C m - M =  PE 2/FM). However, i f  t h e  terms of t r a d e  a r e  unfavor- 
a b l e  t h e  opt imal  p o l i c y  w i l l  be au tarky .  
Let us  assume f o r  a moment t h a t  t h e  terms of t r a d e  a r e  
f avorab le  a t  p r i c e s  F and 
E M' 
The model b u i l d e r s  w i l l  be 
aware of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  FE i s  only an approximate va lue  of t h e  
u n i t  expor t  p r i c e ,  and t h a t  a t  such a p r i c e  t h e  expor t  markets 
could not absorb more than, say, an mount 5 of export's. In- 
troducing Z as an individual upper bound to Z would prevent the 
- 
model producing a completely overspecialized solution. Z would 
clearly be binding* and the solution would be 
It is also easy to see that the optimal values of the dual vari- 
ables will be 
- 
where t is the shadow price of the individual bound, Z. 
We could therefore say that, in this simple situation, com- 
modity prices are determined by the world market price of the 
substitute commodity; the higher export price is neutralized by 
an appropriate tax (t) on exports, which is determined as the 
shadow price of the individual export constraint. 
The analysis of this hypothetical planning model should 
not stop here, however, for we know that Z is a constraint on 
export at given export prices E' If we changed TiE, wouldz 
change too? Suppose that, at least within certain limits, the 
answer is yes, i.e., a decrease in the export price (TiE) would 
increase the capacity for absorption of exports ( 5 ) .  In other 
words, the economy faces decreasing marginal export revenue or, 
what amounts to the same thing, less than perfectly elastic ex- 
port demand. Let D (PE) be the export demand function. Instead 
of the rigid, fixed export bound (z) we could therefore use the 
following f l e x i b l e  c o . n s t r a i n t :  
simultaneously treating PE as a variable in the balance of 
*This is why we use - the word "completely" in the preceding 
sentence, Instead of y ,  Z will now be the upper limit. This 
strong bound on Z will not qualitatively change the solution. 
payments c o n s t r a i n t .  This  would, however, t u r n  our  l i n e a r  pro- 
gramming problem i n t o  a  nonl inear  one,  which i s  g e n e r a l l y  more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  s o l v e .  To keep t h e  l i n e a r  programming framework 
i n t a c t  we could adopt  a  piecewise l i n e a r i z a t i o n  technique ,  a s  
suggested,  f o r  example, by S r in ivasan  ( 1  975) . 
A s  a  t h l r d  p o s s i b i l i t y  we might t r y  t o  save our  l i n e a r  pro- 
gramming model w i th  a  f i x e d  expor t  bound by means of a p p r o p r i a t e  
pos t -op t imiza t ion  anaZys is ,  us ing  t h e  fo l lowing  argument. We 
know t h a t  FE and Z a r e  f i x e d  only on t h e  b a s i s  of some p r e l i m i -  
nary e x p e c t a t i o n s  concerning t h e  volume of expor t  and i ts  
f o r e i g n  currency va lue .  We have so lved  t h e  model and found t h a t  
t h e  expor t  c o n s t r a i n t  (z) i s  binding ( i t s  shadow p r i c e  t i s  
p o s i t i v e ) .  This  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  r e l a x i n g  t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t  would 
i n c r e a s e  t h e  va lue  of t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n .  We a l s o  know, 
however, t h a t  we can i n c r e a s e  only by s imul taneous ly  de- 
c r eas ing  FE. Thus w e  have t o  choose some o t h e r  f e a s i b l e  combi- 
na t ion  of pE and d ,  and s o l v e  =he problem aga in .  We con t inue  
- 
t o  do t h i s  a s  long a s  t i s  p o s i t i v e ,  i . e . ,  Z i s  binding .  
I n  our  simple c a s e ,  it i s  not  necessary  t o  s o l v e  t h e  model 
r e p e a t e d l y ,  changing P and Z each t ime.  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  Z E 
w i l l  remain binding a s  long a s  t h e  terms of t r a d e  a r e  f a v o r a b l e ,  
- 
and s o  t h e  d e s i r e d  s o l u t i o n  w i l l  be reached a t  PE = PM. This  
a s s e r t i o n  can e a s i l y  be checked by a n a l y s i s  of t h e  dua l  s o l u t i o n .  
Observe t h a t  Pd = 
'm 
= 1 and Pm = V FM i n  a l l  s o l u t i o n s  ( inde-  
pendent of pE and d) . The equa t ion  Pd = V FE - t impl ies  t h a t  
- - 
t = 0 when PE = PM. 
The c o n d i t i o n s  f u l f i l l e d  a t  t h e  above s o l u t i o n  a r e  summar- 
i z e d  below: 
These eight equations in eight variables CCd, Cmf 2 ,  M, Pd, 
'm' PE, V) provide a formal representation of the necessary con- 
ditions for a pure c o m p e t i t i v e  (Walrasian) equilibrium. Thus, 
our planning modeler could have reached the same solution by us- 
ing a computable general equilibrium model instead of a param- 
etric linear programming one. 
If the trick has worked, the reader should by now be con- 
vinced that the above procedure is correct and that he has been 
given yet another example of the well-known close connection of 
linear programming and Walrasian competitive equilibrium. 
The fact is, however, that the solution presented above is 
not actually the optimal solution. This can easily be checked, 
for example, by solving the nonlinear programming problem. Sup- 
pose the nonlinear problem is given in the same form as the 
original LP except that FE is no longer a constant parameter 
but a function of Z [the inverse of D(PE)I. The Kuhn-Tucker 
(necessary) conditions for the optimum will be equivalent to 
conditions ( 1 ) - ( 8 ) ,  with one notable exception: instead of 
equation (4) we will have 
where we take the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with 
respect to 2 .  Introducing E as the price elasticity of export 
demand, the above condition can be rewritten as 
The difference between the two solutions can be explained 
plausibly in a number of ways. We will discuss one interpreta- 
tion in a later section, connecting it to the optimum tariff 
problem and computable general equilibrium models. 
Nevertheless, we can draw some useful conclusions from 
this simple and partly misleading exercise. First of all we 
have seen that traditional post-optimization analysis of shadow 
prices from linear programming models may give quite misleading 
i n f o r m a t i o n .  I n  o u r  example Z might  have a l r e a d y  been beyond 
i t s  o p t i m a l  l e v e l ,  b u t t h e s h a d o w  p r i c e  of i t s  upper  bound would 
s u g g e s t  push ing  it even h i g h e r .  S t r a n g e l y  enough, t h e  competi-  
t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  model makes t h e  same m i s t a k e  by t h e  v e r y  n a t u r e  
o f  i t s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  W e  have a l s o  s e e n ,  however,  t h a t  a s l i g h t  
m o d i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  framework e n a b l e s  
u s  t o  p r o v i d e  s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  n o n l i n e a r  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  u s e  of an  e x p o r t  demand f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  non- 
l i n e a r  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem c a n  b e  s e e n  as a n a t u r a l  way of 
t r a n s f o r m i n g  a r i g i d  i n d i v i d u a l  e x p o r t  bound i n t o  a  v a r i a b l e ,  
f l e x i b l e  l i m i t i n g  f u n c t i o n .  I n  t h e  n e x t  s u b s e c t i o n  w e  w i l l  see 
t h a t  a s i m i l a r  f l e x i b l e  bound approach c a n  a l s o  b e  used  t o  t r e a t  
i m p o r t s .  
2 . 3 .  L i n e a r  Model w i t h  A d d i t i o n a l  C o n s t r a i n t s  on I m p o r t s  
A s  mentioned above,  most l i n e a r  programming models used  f o r  
n a t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  w i l l  c o n t a i n  i n d i v i d u a l  bounds on 
i m p o r t s  a s  w e l l  as on e x p o r t s .  T y p i c a l l y ,  t h e  r a t i o  of  impor ted  
goods used t o  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t s  used  ( m )  w i l l  be f o r c e d  t o  obey 
some c o n s t r a i n t .  I n  o u r  o r i g i n a l  model t h e  r a t i o  m = Cm/Cd i s  
+ 
n o t  c o n s t r a i n e d ,  and s o  w e  s h a l l  i n t r o d u c e  m and m- a s  upper  
and lower  bounds ( r e s p e c t i v e l y )  on m. Our p r e v i o u s  programming 
model w i l l  now have t o  be  augmented by two a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  
which can  be  w r i t t e n  j o i n t l y  as 
+ L e t  ti and tm d e n o t e  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  shadow p r i c e s .  A s  a  re- 
s u l t  of t h e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p r i m a l  problem t h e  d u a l  con- 
s t r a i n t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  Cd and Cm a l s o  have t o  be  m o d i f i e d ,  
as f o l l o w s :  
Computable gene ra l  euq i l i b r ium models u sua l ly  adopt  a  d i f -  
f e r e n t  approach ( see  a l s o  Sec t ion  3 ) .  There t h e  dependence of 
t h e  import  s h a r e  ( m )  i s  u s u a l l y  an e x p l i c i t ,  cont inuous ,  smooth 
func t ion  of t h e  r a t i o  o f t h e  p r i c e s  of domestic and imported com- 
modi t ies .  I n  most c a s e s ,  c o n s t a n t  e l a s t i c i t y  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  
used,  such a s  t h e  fol lowing:  
I n  t h e  l i n e a r  programming c a s e ,  observe t h a t  i f  t h e  lower 
l i m i t  on imports is  binding  (neg lec t ing  degenera te  s o l u t i o n s ) ,  
then w e  w i l l  have ti > 0 and Pd < 1 ,  Pm > 1 .  I f  t h e  upper l i m i t  
+ i s  binding then  tm > 0 and Pd > 1 ,  Pm < 1 .  Otherwise Pm = Pd. 
Reversing t h e  argument l e a d s  t o  t h e  fol lowing conc lus ion .  I f  
t h e  shadow p r i c e  of t h e  domestic commodity i s  l e s s  t han  t h a t  of 
t h e  imported commodity, then  w e  w i l l  no t  import  more than t h e  
minimum requ i r ed .  I f  t h e  shadow p r i c e  of t h e  domestic commodity 
i s  more than t h a t  of t h e  imported commodity, w e  w i l l  import  a s  
much a s  p o s s i b l e .  Otherwise t h e  import  volume w i l l  be d e t e r -  
mined by o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  We can w r i t e  t h i s  fo rma l ly  as 
Thus, t h e  import  sha re  can formal ly  be t r e a t e d  a s  a  func t ion  of 
r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  l i k e  i n  a  computable gene ra l  equ i l i b r ium model, a l -  
though i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  i s  n o t  smooth ( s e e  F igure  l ) .  
I t  is  worth no t ing  h e r e  t h a t  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same r e s t r i c -  
t i o n s  on imports  could have been achieved by modifying t h e  ob- 
j e c t i v e  func t ion  r a t h e r  than in t roduc ing  new c o n s t r a i n t s .  So 
f a r  we have assumed a  s imple  a d d i t i v e  o b j e c t i v e  func t ion :  
C = Cm + Cd. I f ,  however, we inrroduced a  piecewise l i n e a r  
o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  wi th  i n d i f f e r e n c e  curves  as i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  
F igure  2 ,  then  w e  would i n  e f f e c t  r e s t r i c t  t h e  import  s h a r e  by 
L 
t h e  same lower (m-) and upper ( m  ) bounds a s  before .  This  type  
Computable 
g e n e r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  
mode 1 
- I,- 
1 
L i n e a r  
programmi 
model 
b 
F i g u r e  1. Impor t  s h a r e  f u n c t i o n s .  
F igu re  2 .  Impor t  r e s t r i c t i o n  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n .  
of objective function could be viewed as the planners preference 
(utility) function with respect to the composition of total source 
.[domestically produced versus imported goods). 
The above interpretation actually seems to be even more 
meaningful than the competitive equilibrium interpretation. In 
the latter case the adoption of a relative-price-dependent im- 
port share function is usually justified on the grounds of neo- 
classicial utility theory. The typical argument goes as follows. 
Suppose consumers across all areas of use have the same CES-type 
utility function (preferences) with respect to domestically pro- 
duced and imported variants of the same commodity. Suppose also 
that, when consumers make their choice, they try to minimize the 
cost of achieving some given level of utility. This assumed 
behavior would lead to the constant elasticity (relative-price- 
dependent) import demand function quoted earlier. (See Appendix 
1 for an analytical derivation of the demand function). 
We should emphasize that the difference in the treatment of 
import restrictions between linear programming models and com- 
putable equilibrium models can once again be seen as the differ- 
ence between f i z e d  (rigic) and f l e x i b l e  individual bounds. The 
relative-(shadow or equilibrium)-price-dependent import share 
implies a variable (flexible) individual bound on imports. The 
larger the gap between the shadow prices of the domestic and 
imported commodities the larger the deviation from the observed 
(or planned) import ratio (m ) , 
0 
In fact, allowing for a smooth variation of the import share 
around its proposed level in a planning model makes at least as 
much sense as the usual import restrictions. Smooth import share 
functions could be incorporated into an otherwise linear model 
without destroying its linear character, through the use of 
piecewise linearization*. In many cases, however, it might turn 
out to be more advantageous to transform the model into either 
nonlinear programming form or computable general equilibrium 
form. 
*Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck ( 1 9 8 1 )  give examples showing how 
piecewise linear (nonlinear) relationships can be introduced 
into linear ~rogramming models and outline some applications. 
To c l o s e  t h i s  s e c t i o n  on programming models, we s h a l l  ex- 
an ine  t h e  e f f e c t  of r e p l a c i n g  t h e  f i x e d  bounds i n  ou r  example 
wi th  f l e x i b l e  ones.  Suppose we have a  l i n e a r  programming model 
w i th  f i x e d  i n d i v i d u a l  bounds on bo th  e x p o r t s  and import  s h a r e s :  
C = Cm + Cd max 
I f  w e  want t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  f i x e d  i n d i v i d u a l  bounds by f l e x -  
b i e l  ones ,  a s  d e s c r i b e d  e a r l i e r ,  w e  should proceed i n  t h e  f o l -  
lowing way. W e  can r e w r i t e  t h e  above l i n e a r  model i n  n o n l i n e a r  
form by r e p l a c i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  wi th  one r e f l e c t i n g  
import  l i m i t a t i o n s  and i n t r o d u c i n g  an expor t  demand f u n c t i o n  a s  
before .  These changes y i e l d  t h e  fo l lowing  model (u s ing  c o n s t a n t  
e l a s t i c i t y  forms) : 
Appendix 1 d e s c r i b e s  how t h e  parameters  hm, hdf  and rl can 
be determed from mo and p ( t h e  parameters  of t h e  import  s h a r e  
f u n c t i o n )  and v i c e  v e r s a .  Parameter D i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  
balance i s  a c o n s t a n t  term obta ined  by s o l v i n g  t h e  fo l lowing  
e x p o r t  demand f u n c t i o n  f o r  PE: 
where i s  t h e  e x p o r t  p r i c e  charged by compet i to rs  (exogenous WE 
v a r i a b l e )  and eo i s  Z s c a l i n g  parameter .  So lv ing  t h e  above 
equa t ion  f o r  PE y i e l d s  
With r ea sonab le  va lues  f o r  t h e  parameters ,  we can expec t  
t o  o b t a i n  an i n t e r i o r  s o l u t i o n .  By i n t e r p r e t i n g  Pd, Pm, and V 
a s  Lagrangian m u l t i p l i e r s  f o r  t h e  corresponding c o n s t r a i n t s ,  
t h e  f i r s t - o r d e r  necessary  (Kuhn-Tucker) c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  maxi- 
mum can be s t a t e d  a s  fo l lows:  
We can show ( s e e  Appendix 1 )  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  (1.1) and (1 .2)  ac tu -  
a l l y  y i e l d  t h e  import  s h a r e  f u n c t i o n  
I t  i s  a l s o  f a i r l y  easy  t o  s e e  t h a t  we can r e p l a c e  t h e  above pro- 
gramming model by t h e  fo l lowing  system of s imul taneous e q u a t i o n s :  
Thi s  i s  a l r e a d y  ve ry  c l o s e  t o  a  t y p i c a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of a  
computable g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  model. To see t h i s  more c l e a r l y  
w e  w i l l  t u r n  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  computable e q u i l i b r i u m  models i n  
t h e  nex t  s e c t i o n  and come back t o  t h e  above model l a t e r .  
W e  c l o s e  t h i s  s u b s e c t i o n  wi th  a  b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h e  
equa t ion  system d e r i v e d  above. Counting t h e  v a r i a b l e s  ( m ,  Cd ' 
Cmr  M I  2 ,  PmI Pdt  PEt V)., w e  f i n d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  one more v a r i -  
a b l e  t h a n  t h e r e  a r e  equa t ions .  Th is  might l e a d  t o  problems of 
overde te rmina t ion .  However, observe  t h a t  a l l  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  a r e  
homogeneous of deg ree  z e r o  i n  v a r i a b l e s  P  P d ,  and V ,  and thus  
m'  
t h e  l e v e l  of one of t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  can be  chosen f r e e l y .  A l -  
t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i f  w e  want t o  reproduce t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  Lagrangian 
m u l t i p l i e r s ,  w e  could  i n t r o d u c e  an a p p r o p r i a t e  " s c a l i n g "  con- 
s t r a i n t  a s ,  f o r  example, t h e  fo l lowing  one:  
3 .  FOREIGN TRADE I N  COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w e  w i l l  f i r s t  o u t l i n e  t h e  argument t h a t  
u n d e r l i e s  most computable g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  models, making use  
of e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same s imple  r e sou rce  a l l o c a t i o n  problem a s  
be fo re .  W e  w i l l  t hen  d e a l  w i th  t h e  cho ice  of e x p o r t  f u n c t i o n  
(pu re  demand, pu re  supp ly ,  o r  combined) and i t s  e f f e c t  on t h e  
r e s t  of t h e  model. The a n a l y s i s  of optimum and e q u i l i b r i u m  SO- 
l u t i o n s . .  w i l l  be postponed t o  t h e  nex t  s e c t i o n .  
3.1. Imperfectly Elastic Export and Import Demand 
Suppose that there are four collections of economic agents: 
suppliers and buyers in the home country and those in the rest 
of the world. Each set contains enough individual agents to en- 
sure that none of them can have a significant influence on 
prices (they are all price takers). Suppliers of the domesti- 
cally produced commodity (total available amount y )  can choose 
whether to sell at home or abroad. They are assumed to be perfectly 
elastic, and thus, if at equilibrium they sell on both home and 
foreign markets, the prices on the two markets must be equal: 
Supplies from the rest of the world are also assumed to be 
perfectly elastic with no supply constraint (i.e., the home 
country is small). The price of the imported commodity is set 
exogenously at level M' Following Armingtonls assumption of 
regionally differentiated commodities, demand in both the home 
country and the rest of the world is assumed to be less than 
perfectly elastic. 
It is assumed that domestic consumers allocate their income 
( ~ ~ 7 )  between domestic and imported commodities in such a way 
that their aggregate utility 
will be maximized. (This CES utility function is assumed to 
represent the regional bias in taste towards otherwise identi- 
cal commodities.~ 
The necessary conditions for the above maximum can be ex- 
pressed in many different ways (see Appendix 1 ) .  The most con- 
venient form for our purposes is represented by the following 
three equations in the three variables m, Cm, and Cd: 
where P = vFM i n  a  pure  compet i t ive  equ i l i b r ium.  
m 
S i m i l a r l y ,  a l l  o t h e r  components being g iven ,  t h e  demand of 
t h e  r e s t  of t h e  world f o r  t h e  commodity expor ted  by t h e  home 
count ry  w i l l  be a  monotone dec reas ing  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  proposed 
expor t  p r i c e  P . Following t h e  t r a d i t i o n  of computable gen- E 
e r a 1  e q u i l i b r i u m  modeling, w e  might s p e c i f y  t h e  demand f u n c t i o n  
i n  t h e  fo l lowing  ( .constant  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y )  form: 
- 
where E ( t h e  expor t  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y ) ,  PWE ( t h e  p r i c e  o f f e r e d  
by compet i to rs  on t h e  world  m a r k e t ) ,  and eo ( a  s c a l e  parameter)  
a r e  a l l  g iven  exogenously. 
We can t h u s  summarize t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  compe t i t i ve  equi-  
l i b r i u m  a s  t h e  fo l lowing  system of e q u a t i o n s ,  i n  which t h e  
endogenous v a r i a b l e s  a r e  m ,  Cd,  Cm, M ,  Z I  Pd, Pm, P E I  and V. 
T r i c e  I d e n t i t i e s  
Demand Func t ions  
Market  C l e a r i n g  C o n d i t i o n s  
C u r r e n t  Accoun t  Ba lance  
The above set of equations does not explicitly contain the 
consumers' budget constraint. This can, however, be derived 
from equations (3.6)-(3.8) with the help of the price identities 
(3.1 ) and (3.2) (Walrasl law) . It is also easy to see that all 
equations are homogeneous of degree zero in Pd, Pm, and V, so 
that one of these variables can be chosen freely. We therefore 
have eight equationsineight variables, which, under the usual 
assumptions on the parameters, will have a unique solution. 
3.2. Imperfectly Elastic Export Supply 
If we look at the export-import specification in typical 
numerical general equilibrium models for a single country, we 
find that demand is generally assumed to be inelastic, whereas 
supply is perfectly elastic*. There are only a few exceptions 
to this assumption. The basic reason for introducing inelastic 
export and import functions is to overcome the problem of over- 
specialization in models with linear homogeneous production 
relations. As mentioned earlier, the usual approach is based 
on Armington's (1969) assumption and typically constant (rela- 
tive price) elasticities are assumed. 
In most cases, and especially for small economies, it would 
be at least as natural to take into account limitations and 
*See, for example, References 1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 16, 20. 
r i g i d i t i e s  i n  su p p l y ,  Th i s  can be done,  f o r  example, by i n t r o -  
duc ing  l e s s  t h a n  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  supp ly  f u n c t i o n s * ,  which 
under c o n s t a n t  e l a s t i c i t y  assumpt ions  cou ld  t a k e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
form**: 
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t .  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  supp ly  combined 
w i t h  imperfec t ly**-*  e l a s t i c  demand ( t h e  s t a n d a r d  assumpt ion)  
l e a d s  f o rm a l l y  t o  t h e  same e x p o r t  f u n c t i o n  a s  t h e  o p p o s i t e  a s -  
sumption,  namely, i m p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  supp ly  w i t h  p e r f e c t l y  
e l a s t i c  demand. ( I t  w i l l  be shown l a t e r  t h a t  t h e  same e x p o r t  
f u n c t i o n  i s  o b t a i n e d  when b o t h  supp ly  and demand a r e  i m p e r f e c t l y  
e l a s t i c .  ) 
To prove t h e  above a s s e r t i o n ,  f i r s t  obse rve  t h a t  p e r f e c t l y  
e l a s t i c  e x p o r t  supp ly  means t h a t  P = Pd/V. S u b s t i t u t i n g  Pd/V E 
f o r  PE i n  t h e  e x p o r t  demand f u n c t i o n  - y i e l d s :  
Next, o bse r v e  t h a t  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  e x p o r t  demand means t h a t  
- 
- 
'E - 'WE' t h a t  i s ,  e x p o r t  p r i c e s  a r e  d i c t a t e d  by t h e  world marke t .  
I f  we s u b s t i t u t e  t h l s  i n t o  our  e x p o r t  supp ly  f u n c t i o n  w e  o b t a i n  
*Export  supp ly  f u n c t i o n s  combined w i t h  a  f a l l i n g  e x p o r t  
u n i t  p r i c e  w e r e  adopted  i n  Z a l a i  ( 1980 ) .  A r e c e n t  model f o r  
Sweden (Bergman and Pbr  , 1982) d e f i n e s  e x p o r t  supp ly  f u n c t i o n s  
a s  d e r i v e d  on t h e  b a s i s  of n e o c l a s s i c a l  j o i n t  p roduc t i on  models.  
* * A l t e r n a t i v e  forms i n c l u d e  p r o d u c t i o n  ( c a p a c i t y )  a s  an  
" e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e "  (see, f o r  example, t h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  j o i n t  
p r o d u c t i on  approach r e f e r r e d  t o  a b o v e ) ,  and t h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
common i n  econometr ic  e s t i m a t i o n s .  See ,  f o r  example, S a t o  
( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  G o l d s t e i n  and Khan (1978 ) .  
***We w i l l  u s e  t h e  t e r m  i m p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  i n  t h e  s e n s e  
of l e s s  t h a n  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c ,  b u t  n o t  p e r f e c t l y  i n e l a s t i c .  
3.3. Equilibrium of Imperfectly Elastic Supply and Demand 
If both demand and supply are imperfectly elastic, we can 
proceed in the following way. We may solve the demand corres- 
pondence for PE, which gives us 
Substitution of this expression for PE in the export supply 
function and solving for Z yields 
where 
Thus, the "pure export demand" CDF) , ''pure export supply" (SF) , 
and "supply-demand equilibrium (EF) export functions have iden- 
tical mathematical forms in our constant elasticity specifica- 
tion. This may imply that, in practice, it might be rather 
difficult to distinguish between the estimates given by the 
various specifications. 
Note also that the equilibrium specification is in some 
sense an "average" of the pure supply and demand specifications 
(the scaling parameter is the geometric average and the elastic- 
ity is h a l f  of the harmonic average of the corresponding "purev 
parameters). It is interesting to see that the "equilibrium 
elasticity" is less than either the supply or the demand elas-. 
ticity, and this may partially explain why empirical estimates 
of the export demand elasticity tend to be rather small, even 
for small economies. 
We should emphasize that our remarks on probable empirical 
findings are very hypothetical. Econometric estimates of export 
functions are scarce and unfortunately very unreliable, and 
estimates of elasticities are especially sensitive to differences 
in samples, estimation techniques, and model specification*. 
This points to the need for special care in choosing both the 
kind of export specification and the size of parameters. We 
will come back to this problem later in section 5. 
Repeating our main conclusion, then, we have found that ex- 
port functions determined on the basis of pure supply or pure 
demand or supply-demand equilibrium have the same algebraic form. 
Does this mean that it makes no difference which export specifi- 
cation is used in a general equilibrium model? Of course not. 
The difference will show' up in the relative export earnings, 
i.e., in the current account balance: the income earned per 
unit exported (PE) will be equal to Pd/V (endogenous) in the pure 
demand case and (exogenous) in the pure supply case. It is WE 
relatively easy to show** thatfinthe equilibrium case, the fol- 
lowing relationship will hold: 
Thus, in this case, the export price will be -basically equal 
to the geometric average of the exogenous world market price and 
the domestic price divided by the exchange rate (this may be 
modified by a term which, in principle, should not be signifi- 
cantly different from 1). 
The main characteristics of the different export specifica- 
tions are summarized in Table 1 .  The table contains all possible 
pairs of supply-demand elasticity situations, even though some 
of them are not relevant (as they stand) in neoclassical general 
equilibrium models. It should be borne in mind that export 
*See, for example, Houthakker and Magee (1  969) , Hickman 
and Lau (i~73), Sato (1977), Golastein and Khan (19781, 
Stone (1 979) , and Browne (1982) . 
**First solve the demand correspondence for PE, then sub- 
stitute ths supply term for Z into the resulting equation, and 
finally solve this new equation for PE. 

functions are only discussed here as part of more complicated 
(multisectoral) models. 
We should perhaps point out, and this is important from a 
computational point of view, that the usual demand-specified 
general equilibrium model can easily be modified to allow for 
alternative export specifications. All that is necessary is to 
replace (3.2) and (3.5) by the following equations 
where c and y are determined as above. If either a or & de- 
creases beyond a certain limit, our specification will reduce 
to the pure supply or demand case. 
Figures 3 and 4, which are based on numerical simulations, 
summarize in geometrical form the main features of the alterna- 
tive export specifications. The horizontal axis is a measure 
of export volume ( 2 )  in both cases. The vertical axis repre- 
sents the unit export price (PE) in Figure 3 and the foreign 
currency equivalent of the domestic price (pd/V) in Figure 4. 
The elasticities of supply and demand are -3 and -2, respectively, 
and therefore the export elasticity in the equilibrium specifi- 
cation will be -1.2. The figures illustrate the impact of a 10 
percent change in Pd/V on the export volume in each of the three 
cases, and show that the amount exported increases by 37, 23, 
and 13 percent under supply, demand, and equilibrium specifica- 
tions, respectively. 
4. OPTIMUM TARIFF IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
4.1. The Optimum Tariff Problem and Applied Models 
In the previous two sections we have discussed some foreign 
trade issues as they appear in multisectoral macroeconomic models 
designed for numerical simulation. We have basically developed 
F i g u r e  3 .  Expor t  demand (D) ana  supp ly  (S)  a s  
f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  e x p o r t  p r i c e  (PE) REL EXP VOL [ Z l  
F i g u r e  4 .  Demand (Dl, su p p ly  (S)  and 
e q u i l i b r i u m  ( E )  e x p o r t  f u n c t i o n s  REL EXP VOL ( Z )  
two simple theoretical models for comparison. One is a nonlin- 
ear programming model, obtained from its more traditional linear 
counterpart by introducing flexible rather than rigid individual 
bounds on export and import activities. The other model is an 
equation system representing the necessary conditions for a 
purely competitive (laissez-faire) equilibrium. We have also 
seen that this equation system and the first-order necessary 
(Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for the optimum in the programming 
model are almost, but not completely, identical. 
The difference between the two sets of conditions is not a 
surprising one, in the light of the theoretical literature on 
international trade. This phenomenon has long been recognized 
as the "optimum tariff" problem (see, for example, Dixit and 
Norman 1981) or as the difference between the planner's optimum 
(welfare optimum) and the pure competitive (laissez-faire) equi- 
librium (see, for example, Srinivasan 1982). It is well known 
that in many situations a welfare optimum solution can only be 
sustained as a competitive equilibrium regulated by appropriate 
"optimum" taxes or subsidies, or through direct government in- 
tervention. 
Although the problem is familiar and has been discussed at 
length in the theoretical literature, it has not been recognized 
as a possible source of concern in computable general equilib- 
rium models. It is not clear why this is so; perhaps the unfor- 
tunate notion of a "small open economy" is partly responsible. 
(A small open economy is defined as one facing exogenously de- 
termined export-import prices.) The optimum tariff problem 
seems to have been discussed only in terms of "large open econ- 
omies." Many of the computable models were designed for small 
economies and, as explained earlier, the adoption of Armington's 
assumption was dictated only by a pragmatic concern with over- 
specialization. Perhaps it was not apparent that the adoption 
of such an innocent assumption would change the otherwise small 
economy into a "large" one. Another partial explanation may 
lie in the ideological values associated with the concepts of 
pure competition and monopoly power ("it would be unfair if a 
country made use of its monopoly power in international trade"). 
The unqualified coupling of equilibrium and Pareto optimum could 
also have contributed to this lack of concern. 
Whatever the case, it remains a fact that the optimum tariff 
problem is seen to distinguish multisectoral planning models of 
programming type from those of general equilibrium type. However, 
this is not actually so. In most cases it is easy to alter the 
general equilibrium model and its solution algorithm so as to 
derive the plannerts optimum instead of the l a i s s e z - f a i r e  equi- 
librium (see Subsection 4.2). Thus a choice must be made. This 
choice is usually quite important because, as will be seen in 
the next section, the export specification can significantly 
affect the solution. 
It is interesting that the optimum may be different from 
the l a i s s e z - f a i r e  equilibrium, even if the economy is "small and 
open" in the sense of facing exogenously given terms of trade. 
This side of the optimum tariff problem is not emphasized in the 
literature but seems to be quite important. It can be associ- 
ated with short-run inflexibility in export supply, and may give 
rise to both taxes and subsidies (not only to taxes as in the 
classical optimum tariff problem) . This will be discussed in 
Subsection 4.3. The practical lessons to be drawn from the 
theoretical discussion will be treated in Section 5. 
4.2. Optimum and Equilibrium: Perfectly Elastic Supply 
Let us examine the equation systems characterizing the 
optimal solution (equations 2.1 to 2.8), and the competitive 
equilibrium (equations 3.1 to 3.8). We see that they differ in 
only one pair of equations, namely, equations (2.2) and (3.2): 
The difference can be explained by the following familiar argu- 
ment. The optimum can be achieved in an otherwise fully compet- 
itive system by introducing an ad v a l o r e m  tax on exports. Since 
supply i s  assumed t o  be p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c ,  domestic s u p p l i e r s  
w i l l  o f f e r  t h e i r  p roduc ts  abroad a t  a  p r i c e  r a t e  [ € / ( I  + c )  Pd/VI 
(expressed i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y ) ,  g e n e r a t i n g  an e q u i l i b r i u m  ex- 
p o r t  demand e q u a l  t o  i t s  opt imal  volume*. 
I t  i s  a l s o  u s e f u l  t o  look a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  
two s o l u t i o n s  from a  d i f f e r e n t  ang le .  Reca l l  t h a t  t h e  p l a n n e r t s  
optimum can be determed by so lv ing  t h e  fo l lowing  programming 
problem**: 
-n  -q-l /n C = (.h C + hm Cm ) d d  + max 
I t  i s  f a i r l y  easy  t o  s e e  t h a t  t h e  pure  compe t i t i ve  s o l u t i o n  
can be found by means of a pa rame t r i c  programming problem of t h e  
fo l lowing  form: 
-1/q 
c = (hd c:' + hm c;') + max 
* I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  no te  t h a t  most econometric e s t i m a t e s  
of expor t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  l i e  between t h e  v a l u e s  -1 and -3 ( s e e  
papers  r e f e r r e d  t o  ear l ier)  and t h a t  such va lues  a r e  u s u a l l y  
adopted i n  numerical  g e n e r a l  equ i l i b r ium models. Observe t h a t  
E = -1 .5  imp l i e s  a  t ax  r a t e  of 200 p e r c e n t  ( i . e . ,  two- th i rds  of 
t h e  revenue i s  taxed  away!); E = -2  corresponds t o  100 p e r c e n t ;  
E = -3 t o  50 p e r c e n t ,  and s o  on. 
**We have a l r e a d y  shown t h a t  Cm = M i n  t h e  op t ima l  s o l u t i o n  
and t h e r e f o r e  our  programming problem has  only  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s  
and two c o n s t r a i n t s .  The o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  and equa t ions  can ,  of 
course ,  a l s o  be de r ived  from t h i s  model. 
The under lying i d e a  i s  very  s imple .  The p l a n n e r ' s  optimum 
model has  been modified i n  such a  way t h a t  i t s  d u a l  s a t i s f i e s  
t h e  equ i l i b r ium p r i c i n g  requirements .  This  has been achieved 
simply by mul t ip ly ing  t h e  expor t  term i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  currency 
c o n s t r a i n t  by € / ( I  + E )  i n  o r d e r  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  "monopoly d i s -  
t o r t i o n "  e f f e c t .  This  change, however, a l t e r s  t h e  meaning of 
t h e  f o r e i g n  currency c o n d i t i o n ,  and t h i s  must be taken  i n t o  ac- 
count i n  t h e  method of s o l u t i o n .  This  i s  achieved by vary ing  
t h e  l e f t -hand  s i d e  ( k )  p a r a m e t r i c a l l y  u n t i l  t h e  s o l u t i o n  (Cm 
and Z ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r )  a l s o  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c u r r e n t  account 
condi t ion* .  
F igure  5 throws more l i g h t  on t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  compet i t ive  
equ i l i b r ium s o l u t i o n .  The h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  i s  p r i m a r i l y  a  mea- 
s u r e  of  Z ,  b u t . t h e d i f f e r e n c e  between H and Z a l s o  y i e l d s  Cd.  
The v e r t i c a l  a x i s  measures Cm. Thus, we can r e p r e s e n t  t h e  in-. 
d i f f e r e n c e  curves  ( invo lv ing  Cm and C d ) ,  t h e  balance of payment 
c o n d i t i o n ,  and t h e  second c o n s t r a i n t  of t h e  programming problem 
a l l  on t h e  same f i g u r e .  
The curve  from 0 t o  d  = 0 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  export- import  com- 
b i n a t i o n s  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  account requirement.  Not ice  
t h a t  t h e  only d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  l a t t e r  and t h e  second con- 
s t r a i n t  i n  t h e  programming model a t  k = 0 i s  t h a t  t h e  expor t  
term i s  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  cons t an t  ~ / ( 1  + € 1 ,  which i s  assumed 
t o  be g r e a t e r  than 1. Hence, t h e  p o i n t s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h i s  l a t t e r  
c o n s t r a i n t  a r e  found on t h e  curve from 0 t o  k  = 0 ,  which l ies  
above and i s  s t e e p e r  t han  t h e  c u r r e n t  account curve.  Thus t h e  
op t imal  s o l u t i o n  of  t h e  programming problem a t  k = 0 c l e a r l y  
cannot m e e t  t h e  c u r r e n t  account  requirement.  I f  w e  change k  
p a r a m e t r i c a l l y  then  the opt imal  s o l u t i o n s  w i l l  l i e  on t h e  curve 
ST. The compet i t ive  equ i l i b r ium s o l u t i o n  is  found where t h i s  
l a t t e r  curve i n t e r s e c t s  t h e  c u r r e n t  account curve**. 
*Lundgren ( 1 9 8 2 )  proposed an a lgor i thm of t h i s  t ype  f o r  
s o l v i n g  a  s p e c i a l  type  of m u l t i s e c t o r a l  equ i l i b r ium model which 
could inco rpora t e  nonmsooth r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
**See Appendix 2 f o r  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  of t h e s e  r e s u l t s .  

It is clear from Figure 5, although it is even more ap~arent 
in Figure 6, that the pure competitive equilibrium cannot be 
optimal. For an optimal solution the indifference curve and the 
current account constraint must be tangential to each other (see 
Figure 6). However, in the competitive equilibrium case the two 
curves intersect and a small movement along the current account 
curve toward the origin would increase the value of the objlective 
(utility) function. 
It is also interesting to note that the common tangent to 
the indifference curve and the transformed current account curve 
at the equilibrium solution is the consumers' budget line. This 
line will pass through the origin (no foreign trade), since this 
is clearly an admissible and budget-exhaustive consumption pat- 
tern at equilibrium. (This is true when the only source of in- 
come is the sale of domestic resources. Observe, however, that 
this is not so for an optimal plan in which taxes on exports 
form an additional source of income.) 
The above argument has demonstrated how nonlinear program- 
ming methods can be used to compute equilibrium solutions for 
certain types of models. In the case of most general equilibrium 
models, however, the solution algorithm is tailored to the spe- 
ciiic modelmd therefore will probably be more efficient than 
some general-purpose algorithm. Thus, it may be better to keep 
the equilibrium-searching algorithm. As we have shown, it is 
usually quite easy to alter the specification and solution algo- 
rithm of the equilibrium model (by introducing a tax on exports, 
for example) to obtain an optimal solution. 
It is sometimes difficult to tell whether the more compli- 
cated empirical models are perfectly consistent with neoclassi- 
cal competitive equilibrium theory, and thus it may happen that 
the introduction of tariffs will not produce the "best" solution. 
It may also be difficult to define a welfare function which could 
be used to check whether there was any improvement on introducing 
tariffs (when, for example, there is more than one consumer). 
In such cases special optimization techniques might be used to 
determine the "second best" solution. 
4.3. Optimum Tariffs in a Small Economy: The Case of 
Imperfectly Elastic Export Supply 
So far we have examined the usual optimum tariff argument 
within a special framework. The optimum tariff situation is 
generally associated with large economies (which have a kind of 
monopoly power over their export prices and potential buyers), 
but we have seen that it is not necessarily limited to such 
"large" economies, at least not in the usual sense. This claim 
may, however, be rejected on the grounds that it is simply a 
question of definition (that a small economy is defined as a 
price-taker on the world market!) and, as such, is a matter of 
taste and completely uninteresting. 
Other readers may not be convinced that the optimum tariff 
argument always leads to taxes on exports and never to subsidies. 
Indeed, in practice we generally find a complicated system in- 
volving both taxes and subsidies regulating foreign trade. 
For both of the above reasons it would be interesting to 
show that optimum tariff situations do arise in small open econ- 
omies. We will demonstrate this in a case in which not only 
taxes but also subsidies may emerge as a means of optimal regu- 
lation. It should not be surprising that this type of situation 
is caused by frictions and constraints that make the export sup- 
ply less than perfectly elastic (at least in the short-to-medium 
run) . 
Let us now consider a small open economy as defined in con- 
ventional (neoclassical) international trade theory, once again 
using an abstract theoretical model to highlight the problem. 
We assume that there is only one commodity involved in a pure 
exchange situation, that world market prices (PE and FM) are 
given exogenously, and we make use of Armington's assumption 
only in describing demand in the home country. Figure 7 illus- 
trates the problem to be investigated. 
To add some realism to our abstract problem, let us suppose 
the following familiar situation. After some major deteriora- 
tion in her terms of trade, the home country adopts a policy of 
borrowing instead of curtailing domestic consumption. This 
Figure 7. Base ( 0 ) .  laissez-faire equilibrium (1) and 
planners' optimum (2) in a small open economy. 
leads to a (base) situation in which the current account shows 
a deficit (do) , but otherwise the economy is (internally) in a 
state of laissez-faire equilibrium (parts and curves labeled 
with o subscripts in Figure 7). For the sake of simplicity, we 
also assume that this situation has already existed for suffi- 
ciently long to allow the country in question to accomodate her- 
self fullytothe new set of world market prices. Thus, the 
domestic price ratios are exactly the same as the world market 
price ratios (see equations G . 1  and 4.2) . 
The above assumptions imply that the following conditions 
are fulfilled in the base case: 
Here w e  have used t h e  s u b s c r i p t  o  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  base  c a s e ;  
a l l  o t h e r  n o t a t i o n  i s  t h e  same a s  b e f o r e .  W e  t h u s  have seven 
endogenous v a r i a b l e s  ( C d ,  Cm, Z ,  rn,  PdI PmI V )  and s i x  equa t ions  
c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h e  base  compet i t ive  equ i l i b r ium ( a s  u s u a l ,  r e l a -  
t i v e  p r i c e s  a r e  i nde t e rmina t e )  . 
One of ou r  assumptions needs s p e c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  W e  
have assumed t h a t  long-run adjustment  has brought about " e q u a l i -  
za t i on"  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and domestic p r i c e s ,  i . e . ,  expor t  sup- 
ply  i s  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  i n  t h e  long run.  However, t h i s  does 
not  mean t h a t  e x p o r t  supply i s  a l s o  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  i n  t h e  
s h o r t e r  run.  I t  can e a s i l y  be seen t h a t  t h e s e  two assumptions 
a r e  n o t  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  Let  us assume t h a t  t h e s h o r t - r u n  e x p o r t  
supply f u n c t i o n  i s  given  by t h e  fo l lowing  cons t an t  e l a s t i c i t y  
func t ion*  
a 
(4 .7 )  
Assume now t h a t  we want t o  a s s e s s  what would happen i n  t h e  s h o r t  
run i f  t h e  government wanted t o  r e s t o r e  e x t e r n a l  equ i l i b r ium.  
*Since Pd = vPE i n  t h e  base c a s e ,  t h e  s c a l i n g  c o n s t a n t  
must be equa l  t o  2,. 
Suppose t h a t ,  t o  achieve t h i s ,  t h e  government s t o p s  borrowing, 
thus  c u t t i n g  down on t h e  supply of f o r e i g n  currency (d = 0 1 ,  b u t  
o therwise  fo l lows  a  laissez-faire s t r a t e g y .  The r e s u l t i n g  s h o r t -  
run equ i l i b r ium can be c a l c u l a t e d  by so lv ing  equa t ions  ( 4 . 2 ) -  
(4.7) wi th  a  new t a r g e t  of zero f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  account  ba lance .  
The only s t r u c t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  two s e t s  of 
equ i l i b r ium c o n d i t i o n s  i s  t h e  replacement of equa t ion  ( 4 . 1 )  by 
( 4 . 7 ) .  This  d i f f e r e n c e  is due t o  t h e  assumed d ivergence  of 
s h o r t -  and long-run expor t  supply adjustment:  expor t  supply i s  
assumed t o  be p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  i n  t h e  long run ,  and imper fec t ly  
e l a s t i c  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run .  (Observe t h a t  t h e  two equa t ions  a r e  
i n  e f f e c t  e q u i v a l e n t  when a approaches minus i n f i n i t y . )  
It i s  e a s i l y  seen t h a t  t h e  long-run equ i l ib r ium,  i .e . ,  t h e  
s o l u t i o n  of equa t ions  1 4 . 3 ) - ( 4 . 6 )  f o r  do = 0, i s  Pare to  s u p e r i o r  
t o  t h e  sho r t - run  equ i l i b r ium;  it i s  i n  f a c t  t h e  op t imal  s o l u t i o n  
i n  t h e  absence of f r i c t i o n  i n  expor t  supply adjustment.  Under 
normal assumptions on t h e  va lues  of t h e  parameters ,  t h e  d i f f e r -  
e n t  s o l u t i o n s  w i l l  be a s  shown i n  F igure  7. What happens i s  
t h e  fo l lowing .  Foreign currency becomes sca rce r . ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
a  h ighe r  exchange r a t e  and,  a s  a  consequence, h ighe r  domestic 
p r i c e s  f o r  both domes t i ca l ly  produced and imported commodities. 
However, s i n c e  expor t  supply i s  l e s s  t han  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c ,  
t h e  domestic p r i c e  o f t h e h o m e  produced commodity w i l l  n o t ,  i n  
t h e  s h o r t  run ,  i n c r e a s e  a t  t h e  same rate a s  t h e  exchange r a t e  
and t h e  p r i c e  of imports .  Thus, i n  t h e  shor t - run  laissez-faire 
equ i l ib r ium t h e  consumption of imported commodities w i l l  be 
reduced more than  t h a t  of domestic commodities (m  d e c r e a s e s ) .  
I n  t he  opt imal  ca se ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, because of t h e  (assmeci)  
l i n e a r  homogeneity of t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  consumption of bo th  
commodities w i l l  dec rease  by t h e  same p ropor t ion  ( a s  would hap- 
pen i n  t h e  long-run Zaissez-faire e q u i l i b r i u m ) .  Of c o u r s e ,  
p r i c e s  i n  t h e  opt imal  c a s e  w i l l  a l s o  i n c r e a s e  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y .  
Thus, t h e o p t i m a l  s t a t e  of t h e  economy (which i s  t h e  same 
he re  a s  t h e  long-run equ i l ib r ium)  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  s h o r t -  
run equ i l i b r i um* .  The Laissza-jaire e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  less e f f i -  
c i e n t  t h a n  t h e  optimum s o l u t i o n  due t o  t h e  impe r f ec t  ad jus tment  
of  t h e  e x p o r t  supp ly .  T h i s  f r i c t i o n  cou ld ,  however, be  overcome 
by a p p r o p r i a t e  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s ,  which must be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  in -  
c r e a s e  t h e  amount of goods expor ted  t o  t h e  op t imal  l e v e l  ( Z * ) .  
Given t h e  ( sho r t - run )  supp ly  f u n c t i o n  and op t ima l  s o l u t i o n ,  t h e  
op t ima l  r a t e  of  subs idy  ($*I  can  be determined by 
which, a cco rd ing  t o  o u r  assumpt ions  Z* > Z o ,  a < 0, i s  indeed 
g r e a t e r  t h a n  1 .  To see t h a t  $* can  be determined a s  above,  f i r s t  
observe  t h a t  P: = V* FE i f  p r i c e s  are set accord ing  t o  t h e  o p t i -  
m a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s .  Thus, i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  subs idy  $ 1  i n t o  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  supp ly  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  fo l l owing  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  
From t h i s  our  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  subs idy  f o l l o w s  immediate ly .  
W e  should  perhaps  make a  few comments concern ing  t h e  above 
a n a l y s i s .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  t h e  above arrangement cou ld  o n l y  work 
i f  t h e  government c o l l e c t e d  t h e  money needed f o r  t h e  subs idy  
through some form of t a x a t i o n .  Thus, i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h i s  s o l u t i o n  
i m p l i e s  a  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f  income which may have unwanted e f f e c t s .  
However, t h i s  cannot  be t aken  i n t o  account  i n  o u r  s i m p l i f i e d  
model. 
- 
*Observe t h a t  t h e d i s t i n c t i o n  between long- and. s h o r t - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  is  n o t  e s s e n t i a l  t o  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n .  A l l  w e  r e a l l y  
need t o  show i s  t h a t  t h e  economy would be b e t t e r  o f f  i f  supply  
w e r e  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c ,  and t h a t  such a  s t a t e  is  a t t a i n a b l e  
under government r e g u l a t i o n .  
A second remark c o n c e r n s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  g e n e r a l i z i n g  
o u r  a n a l y s i s .  I t  i s  f a i r l y  e a s y  t o  show t h a t  t h e  above r e s u l t  
can  be  ex tended  t o  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  l a r g e  open economy, i . e . ,  a n  
economy f a c i n g  a downward-sloping demand c u r v e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
t h e  u s u a l  optimum t a r i f f  argument  and t h e  above argument  can  
s imply  be combined: t h i s  means t h a t  t h e  optimum t a r i f f  d e r i v e d  
from t h e  demand r e l a t i o n s h i p  must be  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  t a r i f f  
i m p l i e d  by t h e  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  
where E and a are t h e  demand and s u p p l y  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a s  b e f o r e ,  
and a i s  t h e  s c a l e  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  ( Z o  b e f o r e ) .  
Thus,  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  t a x  i m p l i e d  by p u r e  demand ( f r i c t i o n -  
less s u p p l y )  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  migh t  be reduced  o r  even o f f s e t  by 
t h e  s u b s i d y  d i c t a t e d  by s u p p l y  c o n s t r a i n t s .  
T h i r d l y ,  w e  would l i k e  t o  c a l l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  one of  o u r  spe-  
c i f i c  a s sumpt ions  and p o i n t  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a  supp ly -  
i m p l i e d  t a x  i n s t e a d  o f  a s u b s i d y .  T h i s  would a r i s e  i f  o u r  com- 
p a r a z i v e  s t a t i c  example r e s u l t e d  i n  a d e c r e a s e  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  
i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r t s  (as c o u l d  happen i f ,  f o r  example,  t h e  g i v e n  
c o u n t r y  borrowed more f rom a b r o a d ) .  T h i s  is  e s p e c i a l l y  impor- 
t a n t  i n  t h e  more complex a n a l y s e s  i n v o l v i n g  many s e c t o r s  and 
d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  of assumed exogenous changes ,  where t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
s e c t o r s  would p r o b a b l y  produce  a v a r i e t y  of d i f f e r e n t  combina- 
t i o n s  of t a x e s  and/or  s u b s i d i e s  based  on e x p o r t  demand and sup- 
p l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
F i n a l l y ,  w e  have t o  do  j u s t i c e  t o  n e o c l a s s i c a l  optimum 
t a r i f f  t h e o r y .  It  i s  clear  t h a t  o u r  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  
s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  i s  n o t  s t r i c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  u s u a l  neo- 
c l a s s i c a l  way of  t h i n k i n g  and r e a s o n i n g .  The b a s i s  of  n e o c l a s -  
s i c a l  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  e v e r y  a c t i o n  of  economic a g e n t s  c a n  be  
e x p l a i n e d  by assuming o p t i m i z i n g  b e h a v i o r .  Thus, f o r  example,  
the export supply function is usually derived by assuming joint 
production of domestic and export commodities, and profit- 
maximizing producers. In such a case a supply-related optimum 
tariff would probably not emerge and so it is not surprising 
that this case is not discussez in the strictly neoclassical 
literature. On the other hand, however, we do not think that 
general equilibrium models can or should be based strictly on 
neoclassical theory. It is a question of personal taste whether 
one prefers an equilibrium model which is strictly consistent 
with neoclassical theory or one which is not. The export supply 
function, for example, can be introduced into a model in a non- 
neoclassical way simply to reflect noninstantaneous adjustment 
to changing situations (frictions other than those implied by 
technological restrictions); this would immediately give rise to 
the above phenomenon. 
5 .  ILLUSTRATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS FOR NUMERICAL MODELS 
5 . 1  About the Models Used 
As promised previously we will now present the results of 
some numerical simulations. Two models have been used for this 
illustrative purpose. 
The first model is rather detailed. A complete mathematical 
statement of the model* is given in Appendix 3, and here we will 
only summarize its main characteristics. 
The model distinguishes 1 9  sectors as follows: 
*The model is a version of the computable general equili- 
brium model developed for experimental purposes by the author 
in collaboration with experts from the Hungarian Planning Office. 
A more detailed description of the model can be found in Zalai 
(1980). The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assis- 
tance in preparing the numerical model and its solution algorithm 
to Gy Boda, I. Csek6, F-n4 Hennel, L. Ldszl6, A. ~ b r ,  
S. Poviliaitis, F. Sivdk, A. Tihanyi and L. Zedld. 
Mining 
E l e c t r i c i t y  
Metallurgy 
Machinery 
Cons t ruc t ion  m a t e r i a l s  
Chemicals 
L igh t  i n d u s t r i e s  
Other manufacturing 
Food Processing 
Cons t ruc t ion  
Agr icu l tu re  
F o r e s t r y  and logging 
Transpor t  and communication 
Domestic t r a d e  
Foreign t r a d e  
Waterworks 
Personal  and economic s e r v i c e  
Health and c u l t u r a l  s e r v i c e s  
Pub l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
Commodities a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  according t o  t h e i r  s e c t o r a l  
o r i g i n  and each s e c t o r a l  commodity is  f u r t h e r  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  
t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s :  domest ica l ly  produced, compet i t ive  and non- 
compet i t ive  import .  I n  import and expor t  a c t i v i t i e s  d o l l a r  
and rouble  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  t r e a t e d  s e p a r a t e l y .  The sha re  
of domestic source and compet i t ive  ( d o l l a r  and roub le )  import 
changes a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of t h e i r  s e l e c t i v e  p r i c e s .  Export  i s  
s p e c i f i e d  i n  a l t e r n a t i v e  ways (pure  supply ,  pure demand, equi-  
l ib r ium of supply and demand and p l a n n e r ' s  optimum) a s  d iscussed  
i n  previous s e c t i o n s .  
Production technology is  descr ibed  by a  Johansen-type of 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h e  use  of s e c t o r a l  commodities is  pro- 
p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  o u t p u t  (Leontief  technology) ,  whereas l abor  
and c a p i t a l  usage i s  s p e c i f i e d  by l i n e a r  homogeneous (Cobb - 
Douglas) smooth product ion r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
Gross investment is  t r e a t e d  a s  a  s p e c i a l  s e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t y .  
Demand f o r  investment is t h e  sum of replacement and n e t  i nves t -  
ment (replacement r a t e  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  r a t e  of amor t i za t ion ! ) .  
Product ion ( supp ly )  of new c a p i t a l  goods i s  r ep re sen ted  by 
f i x e d  c o e f f i c i e n t  technology.  
The remainder of t h e  f i n a l  use  ( termed simply a s  con- 
sumption) i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  a  f i x e d  and a v a r i a b l e  p a r t .  I n  
t h e  r.uns p re sen ted  h e r e ,  t h e  f i x e d  (minimum) p a r t  i s  t h e  ob- 
served 1 9 7 6  ( b a s e )  consumption. I n  o r d e r  t o  be a b l e  t o  measure 
and compare e f f i c i e n c y  ( o p t i m a l i t y )  of v a r i o u s  s o l u t i o n s  e a s i l y  
and unambiguously t h e  s e c t o r a l  composit ion of t h e  v a r i a b l e  
( exces s )  p a r t  of consumption i s  f i x e d ,  t h u s  l e a v i n g  only t h e  
l e v e l  of excess  consumption a s  v a r i a b l e !  This  t r ea tmen t  l e a d s  
t o  a  s p e c i a l  uemand system, formal ly  very c l o s e  t o  t h e  more 
usua l  LES systems.  
P r i c e  format ion  r u l e s  c l o s e l y  fo l low t h e  input -ou tpu t  
t r a d i t i o n s .  The c o s t  of l abo r  and c a p i t a l  i s  de r ived  on t h e  
b a s i s  of c o s t  minimizing assumption. P r i c e s  a r e  formed on 
c o s t - p l u s - p r o f i t  mark-up b a s i s ,  where t h e  exogeneous p r o f i t  
r a t e s  a r e  t h e  observed ones  (one of t h e  non-neoc lass ica l  f e a t u r e s  
of t h e  model) . 
The parameters  and exogeneous v a r i a b l e s  of t h e  model a r e  
eva lua t ed  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  1976 Hungarian s t a t i s t i c a l  i npu t -  
ou tpu t  t a b l e s .  The on ly  no tab l e  excep t ion  from t h i s  r u l e  i s  
t he  s u b d i v i s i o n  of  e x p o r t  and import  f i g u r e s  i n t o  v a r i o u s  sub- 
c a t e g o r i e s  ( t r a d i n g  a r e a ,  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ) .  Because of t h e  
l ack  of publ i shed  d a t a  t h e  s u b d i v i s i o n  h e r e  i s  h y p o t h e t i c a l  
and s e r v e s  only  f o r  i l l u s t r a t i v e  purposes.  Table  2  summarizes 
t h e  major f e a t u r e s  of t h e  base  s o l u t i o n  and v a l u e s  of some 
c r u c i a l  parameters .  
The a e c o ~ d  mode2 i s  i n  many r e s p e c t s  a  s i m p l i f i e d  and ag- 
g rega ted  v e r s i o n  of t h e  f i r s t .  Only 3  s e c t o r s  a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  
The f i r s t  is  t h e  agg rega t e  of s e c t o r s  1, 2, 5 ,  11, 12 of t h e  
1 9  s e c t o r s  l i s t  ("pr imary s e c t o r s " ) ,  t h e  second c o n t a i n s  s e c t o r s  
3-10 ("secondary s e c t o r s " )  and t h e  t h i r d  t h e  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r s  
13-19 ( " t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r s " ) .  Foreign t r a d e  i s  r ep re sen ted  simply 
by one e x p o r t  and one import  v a r i a b l e  i n  each s e c t o r .  I n  t h e  
va r ious  r u n s  t h e  volume and p r i c e  of e x p o r t  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r s  
i s  kept  c o n s t a n t  a t  t h e  base l e v e l .  
T a b l e  2.  Major  F e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  Hungar i an  Economy and Some Model P a r a m e t e r s  
S e c t o r  I I1 I11 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
17 
18  
1 9  
T o t a l  
I S h a r e  o f  b r a n c h e s  i n  t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
11 T o t a l  e x p o r t / p r o d u c t i o n  
111 D o l l a r  e x p o r t / p r o d u c t i o n  
I V  E x p o r t  demand e l a s t i c i t i e s  
IV v V I  VI I V I I I  
V E x p o r t  s u p p l y  e l a s t i c i t i e s  
V I  T o t a l  i m p o r t  r a t i o  (M/(x-2)) 
V I I  C o m p e t i t i v e  d o l l a r  i m p o r t  r a t i o  
V I I I  (Dollar)  I m p o r t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  
The model i s  made more n e o c l a s s i c a l  by t r e a t i n g  import  
and domestic commodities l e s s  t han  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s ,  accord ing  
t o  Armington's p r o p o s i t i o n .  ( I n  t h e  prev ious  model t h e  assump- 
t i o n s  of p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  b u t  l e s s  than  p e r f e c t  a d j u s t -  
ment mechanism gave r i s e  t o  b a s i c a l l y  t h e  same import  f u n c t i o n s . )  
This  and some o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  make t h e  s m a l l e r  model s i m i l a r  t o  
t h e  ones used f o r  s imu la t ions  i n  Western o r  deve lop ing  economics. 
Consumption of t h e  composite (domestic and imported)  commodity 
i s ,  f o r  example, determined by an LES demand s t r u c t u r e .  
The on ly  d e v i a t i o n  from t h e  s t anda rd  n e o c l a s s i c a l  g e n e r a l  
equ i l i b r ium s p e c i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  expor t  supply f u n c t i o n s  
r e f l e c t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r a t h e r  than  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  ad jus tment  
f r i c t i o n s .  Therefore ,  exported and domes t i ca l ly  s o l d  commodities 
a r e  cons idered  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s .  
5 . 2 .  Simula t ion  R e s u l t s  
be fo re  t u r n i n g  our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  numerical  r e s u l t s  w e  
should warn t h e  r e a d e r  t o  i n t e r p r e t  them c a r e f u l l y .  The models 
used he re  g i v e  i n  many a s p e c t s  r a t h e r  rough answers t o  t h e  
~ u e s t i o n  of what could have happened i n  r e a l i t y  i f  such measures 
nad been adopted.  F u r t h e r  ref inement  of t h e  models i s  under 
way. They a r e  used h e r e  on ly  a s  numerical  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h e  
s i z e  e f f e c t  of a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p o r t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  
F i r s t  w e  w i l l  p r e s e n t  t h e  results of the more aggregated 
( n e o c l a s s i c a l )  model. I n  t h i s  ca se  w e  have adopted a  r a t h e r  
s imple  s imu la t ion  framework which can be summed up a s  fo l lows .  
The observed 1976 s t a t e  of t h e  economy w a s  cons idered  t h e  base 
s o l u t i o n .  I t  was assumed, a s  u s u a l ,  t h a t  t h e s e  d a t a  r e f l e c t  
c e r t a i n  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i a  ( e . g . ,  r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  under t h e  
given p r i c e  r eg ime) ,  b u t  they  d e s c r i b e ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  a  d i s t o r t e d  
gene ra l  equ i l ib r ium.  For t h e  sake  of s i m p l i c i t y  w e  assumed 
t h a t  t h e  major d i s t o r t i o n s  manifes ted themselves i n  t h e  p r i c e s ,  
o r  t o  be more p r e c i s e ,  i n  t h e  s e c t o r a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s  of 
r e t u r n s  on t h e  primary r e s o u r c e s .  
Thus, w e  have se t  o u t  t o  ana lyze  t h e  e f f e c t  of i n t r o d u c i n g  
an economically more sound ( compe t i t i ve )  p r i c e  system i n  t e r m s  
of t h e  corresponding r e l a t i v e  s h i f t s  i n  demand and use  of t h e  
produced and primary commdities. I n  forming t h e  p r i c e s  t h e .  
amount of p r o f i t  ( n e t  income) is  determined accord ing  t o  uniform 
(normat ive)  n e t  r a t e  of r e t u r n  requirement  on bo th  l a b o r  and 
c a p i t a l .  
I n  1976 t h e r e  was a  c l o s e  t o  30% t a x  on wages and 5% t a x  
on c a p i t a l  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  Hungarian p r i c e  system, and va ry ing  
p r o f i t  mark-ups. Thus we have chosen 0.3 and 0.05 a s  t h e  base  
va lues  f o r  t h e  n e t  r e t u r n  requi rements  i n  t h e  c a s e  of l abo r  
(wages) and c a p i t a l ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  During t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  w e  
l e t  t h e s e  r a t e s  vary  and set  a t  t h e i r  equ i l i b r ium v a l u e ,  whi le  
t h e  p r o f i t  mark-ups were abol i shed .  The g e n e r a l  l e v e l  of  p r i c e s  
was determined by a  s p e c i a l  s c a l i n g  equa t ion ,  by which w e  re- 
qu i r ed  t h e  g e n e r a l  consumers'  p r i c e  index t o  remain c o n s t a n t .  
We nave gene ra t ed  8 s o l u t i o n s .  They d i f f e r  from each o t h e r  
only  i n  t h e  expor t  t r ea tmen t .  F i r s t  we c a l c u l a t e d  t h e  r e s u l t s  
wi th  f o u r  a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p o r t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s :  pure  e x p o r t  demand 
c a s e  ( D m ) ,  pure  e x p o r t  supply c a s e  (Sup) ,  expor t  supply and 
aemand equ i l i b r ium c a s e  (Equ) , and optimum t a r i f f  c a s e  (Op t ) .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  s i z e  of e x p o r t  e l a s -  
c i c i t i e s  we have r e p e s t e d  each run a t  l a r g e r  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e s  
of t h e  e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  a s  shown below: 
Small E l a s t i c i t i e s  Large E l a s t i c i t i e s  
Sec to r  supply Demand 
1 - 0.5  - 1 .5  
2 - 2.5 - 3.0 
supply Demand 
- 5.0 - 6 . 0  
- 4 . 0  - 8 .0  
The set  of s m a l l e r  e l a s t i c i t i e s  i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f o r  t h e  
numerical  models used i n  p r a c t i c e .  T a b l e  3 and 4 summarize t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s  i n  terms of some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  v a r i a b l e s .  
Most of t h e  a n a l y s i s  can be l e f t  t o  t h e  r e a d e r ,  s i n c e  t h e  
f i g u r e s  speak f o r  themselves .  To ampli fy  some conc lus ions  we 
have prepared Table 5  which c o n t a i n s  on ly  t h e  most r e l e v a n t  
i n £  ormation.  
T a b l e  3 .  Major Real V a r i a b l e  i n  V a r i o u s  Runs  ( S m a l l  M o d e l )  
S e c t o r  Deinl S u p 1  E q u l  T a r 1  Dem2 S u p 2  
RELATIVE CHANGES I N  EXPORT ( b a s e  = 1.) 
T o t a l  1 . 0 1 6  1 . 0 2 3  1 . 0 1 7  0 . 6 6 2  
RELATIVE CHANGES I N  IMPORT ( b a s e  = 1.) 
1 1 . 1 0 3  1 . 1 0 4  1 . 1 0 0  0 . 9 6 1  
2  0 . 9 9 1  0 . 9 9 1  0 . 9 8 4  0 . 7 6 7  
3 1 . 3 3 4  1 . 3 3 4  1 . 3 2 2  0 . 9 7 8  
T o t a l  1 . 0 2 0  1 . 0 2 0  1 . 0 1 3  0 . 8 0 7  
EXCESS CONSUMPTION ( b a s e  = 0 .  ) 
1 5 6 6 . 5 0 0  2 7 2 . 6 0 0  1 8 3 . 8 0 0  2832 .600  
2  1 7 5 3 . 0 0 0  8 4 4 . 4 0 0  5 6 8 . 4 0 0  8 2 7 1 . 0 0 0  
3  1 5 4 9 . 6 0 0  7 4 5 . 2 0 0  5 0 3 . 3 0 0  8 2 5 5 . 8 0 0  
T o t a l  3 8 6 9 . 1 0 0  1 8 6 2 . 2 0 0  1 2 5 5 . 5 0 0  1 9 3 5 9 . 4 0 0  
Table 4. Major Price Variables in Various Runs (Small Model) 
Sector Deml Sup1 Equl Tar1 Dem2 
DOMESTIC PRICE INDICES 
EXPORT PRICE INDICES 
DOMESTIC PRICE PER EXCHANGE RATE 
Table 5. Summary of S imula t ion  R e s u l t s  w i t h  A l t e r n a t i v e  
Export  S p e c i f i c a t i o n s  (Small Model) (percen tage  
changes) 
Dem SUP Equ o p t  
SMALL ELASTICITIES 
T o t a l  e x p o r t  + 1 . 6  + 2.3 + 1 .7  - 33.8 
i n  sec .  1 - 27 - 10 - 8  - 78 
i n  sec .  2 + 7  + 5  + 4 - 28 
T o t a l  import  + 2 + 2 + 1 .3  - 19.3 
T o t a l  excess  + 1.1 + 0.5 + 0.3  + 5.3  
consumption 
Term of t r a d e  + 0 . 6  0  + 0.3 + 18.5  
Exchange r a t e  - 1 4  - 15 - 1 4  + 13 
LARGE ELASTICITIES 
T o t a l  expor t  + 4 . 1  + 1 . 9  + 1 .5  - 8 .3  
i n  s ec .  1 - 71 - 6 2  - 4 1  - 78 
i n  sec. 2 + 18 + 1 4  + 9 + 4 
T o t a l  import  + 2.8 + 1.7 + 1 . 2 '  - 6.9 
T o t a l  excess  + 1.1 + 1 . 4  + 0.9 + 1 . 6  
consumption 
Term of t r a d e  - 1.0 0  + 0.2 + 0.5 
Exchange r a t e  - 15 - 1 4  - 13 - 5  
Table  5 g i v e s  some i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  working of t h e  g e n e r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  models t y p i c a l l y  used. F i r s t  of a l l ,  due t o  t h e  
input -ou tpu t  s t r u c t u r e  producers '  p r i c e s  a r e  r a t h e r  s t a b l e  
(see Table  4 ) .  Therefore  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  dependent v a r i a b l e s  
( l i k e  e x p o r t ,  import  s h a r e )  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  fo l low t h e  same p a t -  
t e r n  of change i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  s o l u t i o n s .  Only t h e  op t ima l  
s o l u t i o n  i s  an  excep t ion  t o  t h i s  g e n e r a l  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  where w e  
can see q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  s o l u t i o n s .  
It  i s  a l s o  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  s i z e  of e l a s t i c i t i e s  has  r e a l  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  s i z e  o r d e r  of changes.  I f  they a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  
smal l  t h e  changes a r e  l a r g e r  and v i c e  v e r s a .  This  e f f e c t  i s  
v i s i b l e  even i f  w e  compare only  t h e  demand, supply and equi -  
l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n s  i n  one ( smal l  o r  l a r g e )  c l a s s  of e l a s t i c i t i e s .  
A s  pointed o u t  e a r l i e r ,  equi l ibr ium e l a s t i c i t i e s  a r e  t h e  s m a l l e s t  
of a l l ,  and i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  example w e  have chosen t h e  supply 
e l a s t i c i t i e s  smal ler  than the  demand ones. These show up i n  
the  r e spec t ive  o rde r s  of change i n  t h e  expor ts .  Thus, t h e  l a r g e r  
t h e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  room for  t h e  f o r c e s  o f  compnra t i ve  
advantage i n  s t r u c t u r a l  a d j u s t m e n t  ( a l l o c a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y ) .  
However, t h e  above p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  of l a r g e r  e l a s t i c i t i e s  
a r e  coun terba lanced  by t h e  terms o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  brought i n  
by t h e  same demand e l a s t i c i t i e s .  Thus, f o r  example, i n  t h e  
pure export  demand case  these  two e f f e c t s  o f f s e t  each o t h e r .  
The increased a l l o c . a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  o f f s e t  by a  1 . 6 %  simul- 
taneous d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of t h e  terms of t r a d e  (from + 0 . 6  t o  - 1 . 0 )  , 
and t h e  inc rease  of consumption remains t h e  same (1.1). 
The terms o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  brought i n  by t h e  demand e l a s -  
t i c i t i e s  can b e s t  be seen i n  the  case  of o p t i m a l  t a r i f f  s o l u t i o n s  
which takes  them t o  an extreme. When the  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a r e  small  
the  optimizing l o g i c  of t h e  s o l u t i o n s  genera tes  an 18.5% ( ! )  
gain  i n  t h e  terms of t r a d e ,  and t h i s  i s  cne r e a l  source of t h e  
outs tanding welfare  improvement (+ 5.3% inc rease  i n  consumption). 
With l a r g e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  t h i s  e f f e c t  is only marginal a s  com- 
pared t o  t h e  a l l o c a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y .  This a l s o  exp la ins  why 
the var ious s o l u t i o n s  a r e  so  c l o s e  t o  each o t h e r  i n  the  case  of 
l a r g e r  e l a s t i c i t i e s .  
I t  i s  a l s o  worth not ing t h a t  t h e  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  s o l u t i o n s  
and o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n s  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  economic 
pol icy suggest ions.  The former ones suggest  a  more open ( i n  
fo re ign  t r a d e )  pol icy :  both t o t a l  expor ts  and t o t a l  imports 
inc rease  i n  a l l  t he  s i x  so lu t ions .  The optimal s o l u t i o n s ,  on 
the  o the r  hand, suggest  r a t h e r  severe  import-export r e s t r i c t i o n s .  
F i n a l l y ,  a s  a  mat ter  of i n t e r e s t ,  w e  would l i k e  t o  r e p o r t  
on some s p e c i f i c s  of t h e  o p t i m a l  t a r i f f  s o l u t i o n .  A s  we have 
discussed i n  the  t h e o r e t i c a l  p a r t  of t h i s  paper,  the  optimal 
t a r i f f  s o l u t i o n  works i n  t h e  following way. The exchange r a t e  
w i l l  be cor rec ted  by taxes  o r  subs id ies  i n  r e g u l a t i n g  expor ts .  
A l l  the l a i s s e z - f a i r e  s o l u t i o n s  suggested a  13%-15% r e v a l u a t i o n  
of the  exchange r a t e .  (This can be explained by the  cca  16% 
decrease  i n  t h e  p r i c e  of t h e  major expor t ing  s e c t o r ,  number 2 . )  
A s  opposed t o  t h i s ,  t h e  op t imal  t a r i f f  s o l u t i o n  i m p l i e d  a  13% 
d e v a l u a t i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  smal l  e l a s t i c i t i e s  and on ly  5% re -  
v a l u a t i o n  i n  t h e  o t h e r  c a s e .  This  e x p l a i n s  why import  i s  r e -  
duced i n  both  ca ses .  To d i scourage  e x p o r t ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
e x p o r t  t a x e s  have t o  be in t roduced .  The i r  o r d e r  of magnitude 
i n  t h e  f i r s t  two s e c t o r s  a r e  98% ( !  and 42% when e l a s t i c i t i e s  
a r e  s m a l l  and 4 0 %  and 1 1 . 7 %  when they  a r e  h igh .  ( I f  supply were 
p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  t h e  corresponding f i g u r e s  would be 67% and 
33% i n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e ,  and 1 7 %  and 12.5% i n  t h e  o t h e r .  Thus, 
excep t  f o r  the .  l a s t  f i g u r e ,  t h e  supply e f f e c t  adds  t o  t h a t  of 
demand.) A l l  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  c l e a r l y  q u e s t i o n  t h e  r e l evance  of 
op t lmal  t a r i f f  argument i n  t h e  c a s e  of smal l  ( c o n s t a n t )  demand 
e l a s t i c i t i e s .  
Thus, we t h i n k  t h e  s m a l l  example i s  a l r e a d y  convincing 
enough t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of expor t  demand s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and 
e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  s i z e  of demand e l a s t i c i t i e s  commonly used i n  
computable g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  models must be  c r i t i c a l l y  re- 
examined. W e  w i l l  come back t o  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  t h e  nex t  sub- 
s e c t i o n .  Before  t h a t ,  however, w e  want t o  p r e s e n t  some r e s u l t s  
gained by t h e  more complex and d i sagg rega t ed  model i n  o r d e r  
t o  show t h a t  ou r  f i n d i n g s  a r e  n o t  overexagera ted  by t h e  s m a l l  
model. 
W e  have a l r e a d y  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  main f e a t u r ~ e s  of t h e  1 9  
s e c t o r  model and a l s o  some c r u c i a l  parameters  ( s e e  Table  2 ) .  
The s i m u l a t i o n  framework i n  t h i s  ca se  w a s  somewhat d i f f e r e n t .  
The q u e s t i o n  w e  asked from t h i s  model was t h e  fo l lowing .  Sup- 
pose Hungary wanted t o  ach ieve  a  ze ro  ba lance  of t r a d e  i n  h e r  
d o l l a r  t r a d e  i n  1976, what s t r u c t u r a l  changes would t h i s  need? 
Again, w e  c a l c u l a t e d  f o u r  s o l u t i o n s  d i f f e r i n g  on ly  wi th  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  e x p o r t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  Some a d d i t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c s  of t h e  
c a l c u l a t i o n s  should be mentioned be fo re  p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  main 
r e s u l t s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  ba lance  of t r a d e  w a s  supposed t o  be 
r e s t o r e d  a t  t h e  c o s t  of a  more or  l e s s  uniform dec rease  of 
consumption. Second, roub le  t r a d e  and terms of t r a d e  were 
kep t  cons t an t .  Th i rd ,  p r o f i t  r a t e s  were assumed t o  remain t h e  
same. 
The d e t a i l s  of t h i s  model s o l u t i o n s  a r e  n o t  t o o  i n t e r e s t i n g  
and might a l s o  be mis lead ing .  Therefore  w e  dec ided  t o  show he re  
some of i t s  main i n d i c a t o r s  on ly  (Table 6 ) .  The r e s u l t s  a r e  
p e r f e c t l y  good t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  d i s c u s s e d  a l -  
t e r n a t i v e  e x p o r t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  and t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  of t h e  
l a i s s e z - f a i r e  and p l a n n e r s '  optimum s o l u t i o n s .  The d e t a i l e d  
p r e s c r i p t i o n s  of t h e  model a r e  a t  l e a s t  q u e s t i o n a b l e .  The 
f i g u r e s  speak f o r  themselves and suppor t  ou r  e a r l i e r  conc lus ions ,  
t h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  i s  no need t o  comment on them. 
Table 6 .  Main I n d i c a t o r s  (Large Model) 
(base  = 100) 
D e m  SUP 
T o t a l  d o l l a r  expor t  128.18 116.51 
T o t a l  d o l l a r  import  97.35 98.44 
T o t a l  trade/GDP r a t i o  * 84.81 82.90 
F i n a l  consumption 92.04 95.52 
Do l l a r  terms of t r a d e  89.89 100.00 
Do l l a r  exchange r a t e  111.21 108.87 
* base = 80.42 
5.3.  Concluding Remarks 
I n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  of  t h i s  paper w e  argued t h a t  t h e  r i g i d  
i n d i v i d u a l  bounds on e x p o r t  and import  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t y p i c a l  of 
programming-type macroeconomic models can be u s e f u l l y  r ep l aced  
~y  f l e x i b l e  bounds. Th i s  replacement  was, i n  f a c t ,  c a r r i e d  o u t  
us ing  some t o o l s  borrowed from s i m i l a r  models of t h e  computable 
g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  type.  W e  have a l s o  argued t h a t  t h e  cho ice  
of parameters  i n  t h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  e x p o r t  and import  f u n c t i o n s  
i s  a t  l e a s t  a s  c r u c i a l  a s  t h e  choice  of t h e  s i z e  of i n d i v i d u a l  
bounds, and t h i s  i s  c l e a r l y  demonstrated i n  t h e  numerical  s i m -  
u l a t i o n s .  Thus, s i n c e  t h e s e  parameters  cannot  be e s t ima ted  
any more r e l i a b l y  t han  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  bounds can be determined,  
t h e r e  i s  some degree  of a r b i t r a r i n e s s  i n  bo th  c a s e s .  
Our numerical  examples a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  te rms-of - t rade  
e f f e c t s  i n t roduced  by e x p o r t  demand f u n c t i o n s .  I t  i s  impor tan t  
t o  emphasize t h a t  i n  many c a s e s  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  a r e  u n r e a l i s t i c  
and unwanted. The smaller t h e  e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  
terms-of- t rade e f f e c t s .  Small  e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  however, u s u a l l y  
a r i s e  on ly  because t h e  observed changes i n  e x p o r t s  a r e  s m a l l ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  when compared t o  changes i n  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s .  ( I n  
some c a s e s ,  s t r a g e l y  enough, e l a s t i c i t i e s  i n  t h e  range ( - 1 , O )  
a r e  assumed, which would mean t n a t  t h e  given count ry  could  in-  
c r e a s e  i t s  e x p o r t  ea rn ing  by reduc ing  expor t s ! )  
I t  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c r u c i a l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between and 
p o s s i b l y  s e p a r a t e  t h e  changes i n  t h e  terms-of- t rade and t h e  
changes i n  t h e  speed of e x p o r t  adjustment .  The s p e c i a l  ad- 
vantage of i n t r o d u c i n g  bo th  demand and supply f u n c t i o n s  l i e s ,  
i n  p a r t ,  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  Small supply e l a s t i c i t i e s  imply smal l  
s h i f t s  i n  e x p o r t s  ( i f  needed) ,  whi le  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  demand 
e l a s t i c i t y  can more a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t  t h e  assumed changes i n  
t h e  terms-of - t r a d e .  
A major problem wi th  t h e  most commonly used e x p o r t  and 
import  f u n c t i o n s  i s  t h e i r  c o n s t a n t  e l a s t i c i t y  form. Even i f  
one could  r e l y  on t h e  econometr ic  estimates of t h e s e  e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  
they  would g i v e  an a c c u r a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of supply and demand 
behavior  on ly  i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  neighborhood of t h e  observed 
p a t t e r n .  Another problem wi th  c o n s t a n t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  i s  t h a t  
t h e  e f f e c t s  of i n c r e a s e s  and d e c r e a s e s  i n  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  a r e  
t r e a t e d  symmetr ical ly .  I t  i s  r a t h e r  u n r e a l i s t i c  t o  assume 
t n a t ,  s ay ,  a  10% i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r t s  w i l l  produce a  change i n  
r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  of  t h e  same s i z e  a s  a  1 0 %  dec rease  i n  e x p o r t s .  
One would i n t u i t i v e l y  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  e x p o r t  demand would 
be much more e l a s t i c  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  p r i c e s  t han  
t o  a  dec rease  i n  p r i c e s .  I t  would t h e r e f o r e  seem reasonab le  t o  
r e p l a c e  t h e  c o n s t a n t  e l a s t i c i t y  forms by unsymmetric forms w i t h  
v a r i a b l e  e l a s t i c i t e s .  S ince  obse rva t ions  u s u a l l y  l i e  w i t h i n  a  
narrow range,  it  i s  extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  make econometric 
e s t i m a t e s  of  such f u n c t i o n s .  The on ly  p o s s i b i l i t y  seems t o  be 
t h e  combination of econometric e s t i m a t e s  w i t h  q u a l i t a t i v e  expor t  
judgments. 
On t h e  whole, o u r  numerical  s i m u l a t i o n s  demonstrated t h a t  
t h e  t r ea tmen t  of f o r e i g n  t r a d e  i n  a  m u l t i s e c t o r a l  macromodel 
has  a  very g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t s  of t h e  model. 
Tnis  is  not  very s u r p r i s i n g  s i n c e  t h e s e  models o p e r a t e  on t h e  
basis of resource reallocation. The freedom in reallocating 
resources in an open economy depends greatly on the potential 
for foreign trade. Thus, it is very important to devise an 
accurate representation of this potential: it seems that the 
currently available techniques are not sufficiently sophisticated 
to handle these problems adequately. 
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APPENDIX 1 :  SMOOTH SUBSTITUTION FUNCTIONS AND IMPLIED 
DEMAND FUNCTIONS : SOME BASICS \ 
The concept o f  substitutability of commodities in use is  a  
t r i v i a l  and o l d  one.  I t  has  acqu i r ed  a  c e n t r a l  and much deba t -  
a b l e  r o l e  i n  some s t r eams  of economics, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  
n e o c l a s s i c a l  economies. 
The concep t  of s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  i s  c l o s e l y  connected w i t h  
t h e  c l a s s i c a l  concep t  of use value ( o r  v a l u e  i n  u s e ) .  Th i s  
l a r g e l y  f o r g o t t e n  concep t  has  been i n  t h e  f o r e f r o n t  of Marx's  
economic a n a l y s i s  a s  w e l l .  A g e n e r a l  and s a t i s f y i n g  t h e o r y  of 
use-value i s  s t i l l  l a c k i n g .  I t  i s ,  however, appa ren t  t h a t  pro- 
duction functions, utility functions and welfare functions t r y  
t o  measure t h e  j o i n t  v a l u e  i n  some d e f i n i t e  u se  of some commodi- 
t i e s ,  b u t  of  c o u r s e  i n  an ext remely  o v e r s i m p l i f i e d  manner i n  
most c a s e s .  
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e r e  a r e  a lmos t  insurmountable  o b s t a c l e s  i n  
t h e  way of g e t t i n g  r e l i a b l e  e s t i m a t e s  of s u b s t i t u t i o n  p o s s i b i l -  
i t i e s .  I n  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  e s t i m a t i o n  of s u b s t i t u t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  
a  l o t  of a r b i t r a r y  a priori assumpt ions  a r e  made about  t h e  spe- 
c i a l  form of  t h e  f u n c t i o n  and t h e  unde r ly ing  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
mechanism. 
One should  be  v e r y  c a r e f u l  i n  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
p o s s i b i l i t y  from t h e  assumed mechanism r e g u l a t i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  
of s u b s t i t u t i o n .  The h e a r t  of t h e  c r i t i q u e  a g a i n s t  t h e  neo- 
c l a s s i c a l  t rea tment  i s  (o r  should be a t  l e a s t )  d i r e c t e d  toward 
t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  mechanism r a t h e r  than t h e  concept i t s e l f .  The 
main assumption t h e r e  i s  t h a t  the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i s  dr iven  by 
r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  changes and t h a t  dec is ion  makers always optimize 
t h e i r  choice of a  s p e c i f i c  commodity bundle. I n  s h o r t ,  a  p e r -  
f e c t  and r a t i o n a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  mechanism i s  assumed. I t  i s  
c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  i n  r e a l i t y  p r i c e s  along cannot e x p l a i n  
s h i f t s  i n  production o r  consumption and, a l s o ,  adjustment i s  
never f r i c t i o n l e s s  and instanhaneous.  Many f a c t o r s  in f luence  
the  s u b s t i t u t i o n  process ,  most of which a r e  neglected i n  e s t i -  
mating s u b s t i t u t i o n  func t ions  on t h e  bas i s  of n e o c l a s s i c a l  
t h e o r e t i c a l  assumptions. 
In  a  c e r t a i n  l i m i t e d  r o l e ,  never the less ,  smooth s u b s t i t u -  
t i o n  funct ions  can be f r u i t f u l l y  appl ied  i n  macro planning (o r  
fo recas t ing)  models. The parameters have t o  be chosen on t h e  
b a s i s  of a v a i l a b l e  q u a n t i a t i v e  and q u a l i t a t i v e  information from 
planners ,  r a t h e r  than on t h e  usua1,very u n r e l i a b l e  econometric 
es t imates .  They should be t r e a t e d  as  t e c h n i c a l  devices  r a t h e r  
than t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s t r u c t s .  
A . 1 .  Derivat ion of A l t e r n a t i v e  Relat ionships 
Suppose t h a t  two commodities ( say ,  m = imports,  d  = domes- 
t i c ) ,  a r e  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  a  given kind of use. Any given l e v e l  
of " j o i n t  use-value", C can be achieved by var ious  combinations 
C 
of t h e  two sources of supply,  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  following CES-type 
func t iona l  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  
(A. 1 
where 1/1+6 is  t h e  cons tan t  e l a s t i c i t y  of s u b s t i t u i o n ,  hd and 
h  a r e  given cons tan t s ,  Cd and Cm a r e  t h e  amounts of commodities 
m 
from domestic source and imports ,  r e spec t ive ly .  
We look f o r  a  c o s t  minimizing combination of ind iv idua l  
inpu t s  a t  p r i c e s  Pd and Pm f o r  f ixed  C c .  This requi res '  minimiz- 
ing the  t o t a l  c o s t  funct ion  
subject to the constraint given by (A.1). 
Let us introduce PC for the Lagrangian multiplier, which 
can be interpreted as the minimum (optimal) cost of achieving 
one unit of the joint use-value (the shadow price of the joint 
use-value or of the "composite commodity"). The Lagrangian will 
take the following form 
Differentiating L with respect to Cd and Cm yields the fol- 
lowing two (additional) necessary conditions for a minimum 
(after slight manipulation) : 
(A. 4) 
Let us now take equations (,A. 4) and (A. 5) and solve them for 
C and Cm respectively: d 
(A. 7 )  
The res.ulting equations determine demand for domestic and 
imported commodities as functions of demand for the given (joint) 
use-value (Cc) of it's shadow price (PC) and of the respective 
individual prices (Pd or P,). These are familiar expressions 
from the duality theorems of production and cost (profit) func- 
tions. Tney can be obtained as the first order partial derivatives 
of the (o~timal) cost function (PcCc), which will be determined 
later. 
Observe also that the necessary conditions (.A. 4 )  and (A. 5) 
imply the following relationship for the ratio of the amounts 
of the two commodities (denoted by m) : 
which is, in fact, an import demand function similar to the one 
used in this paper, with 
Returning to the solution of the optimum problem observe 
now that substituting the right hand side of equation (A.6) 
and (A.  7) for Cd and Cm in equation (A. 1) respectively, after 
suitable rearrangement we will get the optimal unit cost func- 
tion (for the joint use-value) : 
A1.2. Base Related Forms 
It is worth checking that both the optimal cost (PcCc) and 
the optimal amounts of the two commodities (Cm and Cd) are 
homogeneous functions of degree o of the parameters hm and hd. 
Thus, if Pd and Pm are price indices referring to some base 
(reference) values (P: = P: = I) we may choose the level of 
hm and hd such that the shadow price in the base case (P:) will 
also be 1. This implies, of course, that the measure of joint 
use-value must be chosen such that in the base year its level 
be the simple algebraic sum of the amount of the two components. 
This can be seen from the following chain of equations 
From all this it follows that in the above case the fol- 
lowing relationships must also hold: 
(A. 10) 
and 
Parameters sdo and smo = 1 
- Sdo denote the shares of the 
two kinds of source in total use in the b a s e  year (or b a s e  c a s e  
if we make model comparisons). Their substitution for hd and 
hm in the earlier derived correspondences will give us useful 
alternative forms. Let us first reformulate (A.6), the optimal 
demand equation for the domestic commodity (by simple analogy 
one can make the same transformation for equation A.7): 
In some cases, total expenditure (E) is known rather than 
the level of the target use-value Kc). Thus the problem is to 
maximize Cc subject to the budget constraint. By symmetry one 
can easily see that knowing E, Cc can be determined simply as 
E/Pc, where PC can be calculated again in accordance with (~.9). 
We can also rewrite (A.9) using the base share parameters: 
Equation (A.9') shows clearly that the shadow price of the "com- 
posite commodity" is nothing more but the w e i g h t e d  a v e r a g e  of 
the "component" price. If u = 0, i.e., the two commodities are 
(strict) complements, then the shadow price is a weighted alge- 
braic average of the component prices. If l~ = 1 ,  i.e., substi- 
tution possibilites take the form of a Cobb-Douglas function, 
the shadow price will be a geometric average of the components 
(as can be expected) : 
This can be checked by taking p to the limit 1 in (A.gt). The 
reader can also check the emergence of other concepts of average 
often used by economic statisticians. 
Thus, if Cc can be expressed as E/Pc, then (A.6) can be 
further rewritten as 
(A. 12) 
This form is especially useful in specifying demand equation 
systems in a computable general equilibrium model. The familiar 
Linear Expenditure Systems (LES) can, for example, be general- 
ized to cover cases will elasticity of substitution different 
from 1. The generalized form of demand for commodity i (Ci) 
can be written as follows 
(A. 13) 
where b is the minimum (or base) consumption levell of commodity i 
it ci is its share from excess expenditure at orices all 3 (base 
share). Note that if P = 3 then equation CA.13) is reduced to 
the familiar case of an LES system. At p = 0 (lack of substi- 
tutability) theequations will result in a form that corresponds 
to the case of maximizing excess consumption in a fixed struc- 
ture. Such treatment is characteristics for some linear plan- 
ning models. To make the picture full let us see also the case 
of perfect substitutability, i,e., when p goes to infinity. 
As can be expected, in this case the excess consumption will be 
zero from all commodities whose relative price is higher than 
the minimum (Pmin)' The rest of the commodities (in most cases 
one commodity only) will have their share from the excess con- 
sumption in fixed proportion (given by the corresponding values 
APPENDIX 2: ANALYTICAL DERIVATION OF THE GRAPHICAL 
FIGURES 5 AND 6 
The problem is to characterize the solutions of the fol- 
lowing parametric (in k) constrained optimum problem. Maximize 
subject to 
A 
where A < 1 ( #  0 1 ,  -1 < A < 0, andk, h, m, Pet Pmf 2,  and Y 
are all positive constants. All variables (Cd, C, Z )  must 
fulfill the usual nonnegitivity constraint. 
Observe that (I*) is a strictly monotonic increasing func- 
tion of both Cd and Cm. Therefore in the optimal solution, both 
(2*) and (3*) will be fulfilled as equalities. Thus we can 
solve (2*) for Cd and (3*) for Cm, respectively, i.e, express 
them as functions of Z: 
Replacing Cd and Cm by t h e  r e s u l t i n g  expres s ions  i n  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n  ( I * )  w i l l  reduce t h e  problem t o  an unconstra ined maximum 
(except  f o r t h e s i g n  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of t h e  v a r i a b l e s ) .  Observe 
a l s o  t h a t  i n s t e a d  of ( I * )  w e  can use  i t s  monotonic t r ans fo rma t ion  
g iven  below 
Thus, w e  can s i m p l i f y  our  a n a l y s i s  and concern wi th  t h e  un- 
cons t r a ined  maximum of t h e  fo l lowing  f u n c t i o n  of Z :  
where f o r  n o t a t i o n a l  s i m p l i c i t y  
and k  k' = -
'm 
f i i th  some manipulat ion t h e  necessary  f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  t h e  maximum of (7*)  y i e l d s  t h e  fo l lowing  equa t ion :  
ha (Y - Z )  = (ma) a ( # , : A A z  -- l+h. - k t  ZAa i 
where a  = 1/p-1  and thus  a  < 0 .  
On t h e  b a s i s  of cond i t ion  (8*) we f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  t h e  
op t imal  va lue  of Z  i s  a  monotonic i n c r e a s i n g  func t ion  of param- 
e t e r  k. To show t h i s ,  w e  w i l l  t r e a t  (8*) a s  an i m p l i c i t  func- 
t i o n  of Z  and k' and t a k e  i t s  d e r i v a t i v e  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  k t ,  
which y i e l d s  : 
A z ' + ~  - k t )  ZAa-l -ha z = (ma) a i a  + A k zl; 
From t h i s  we can exp res s  Z '  t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  of t h e  op t ima l  va lue  k t  
of Z with  r e s p e c t  t o  k ' ,  i n  t h e  fo l lowing  way 
A i  = (mala z h a  ha- 1 ( l + a ) h  + ha ( 9 * )  ( m a ) "  (ha)  cm z + (mala A z 
Assuming t h a t  0  < Z < P and Cm 2 - 0 it can e a s i l y  be checked 
t h a t  Z i  > 0 a s  p o s t u l a t e d .  Th i s  means t h a t  a s  k  i n c r e a s e s ,  s a y ,  
from l e v e l  0  ( i . e . ,  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  curve i n  F igu re  5 s h i f t s  
downwards), t h e  op t ima l  amount expor ted  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  and v i c e  
v e r s a .  
- 
There e x i s t ,  however, upper and lower l i m i t s  on e x p o r t ,  Y 
and 0 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Taking t h e s e  l i m i t s  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  w e  
need t o  f i n d  o u t  under what c i rcumstances  Z w i l l  approach t h e s e  
l i m i t s  and what happens t o  t h e  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  a t  t h e  same t i m e .  
I t  i s  easy  t o  see t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  va lue  of k such 
- 
t h a t  c o n s t r a i n t  ( 3 * )  can be  s a t i s f i e d  on ly  i f  Z = Y and Cm = 0. 
I f  t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  then  Cd must c l e a r l y  be 0  i n  t h i s  s i n g l e  
f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n .  Depending on t h e  va lue  of it may o r  may 
no t  be i n  t h e  domain of t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n ,  t hus  an op t imal  
- 
s o l u t i o n  w i l l  approach Z = Y ,  Cm = Cd = 0. 
Next we look a t  t h e  o t h e r  l i m i t  f o r  Z ,  i - e . ,  Z = 0,  which 
i s  approached i f  k  J e c r e a s e s  beyond any l i n i t .  I t i s  easy t o  s e e  
from ( a * )  t h a t  Z cannot  assume zero  value i n  an op t imal  so lu-  
t i o n  wi th  f i n i t e  k  (because i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  RHS would be 0 ,  
whi le  t h e  LHS would be  h a y ) .  Thus w e  can conclude t h a t  w i th  k 
dec reas ing  beyond any l i m i t ,  Z w i l l  approximate 0  and Cm goes 
t o  i n f i n i t y .  
These considerations imply that the locus of optimal solu- 
tions of the parametric programming problem discussed, i.e., 
the ST curve is downward sloping and assymptotic to the vertical 
axes as k approaches minus infinity (i.e., Z to zero). Also, 
ST approaches point i? on the Z axis when k tends to its upper 
critical value. The homogeneity of the objective function im- 
plies that SF will be convex from below as shown in Figure 5. 
This analysis shows us that there will always be such a 
value of k, at which the optimal solution lies on the zero 
balance of payment curve, and that such a solution can be sought 
by means of simple iteration. 
APPENDIX 3: FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE MODELS USED IN 
THE NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
Endogenous  V a r i a b l e s  
X gross output in sector j = 1,2, ..., n j 
Mirr Mid competitive rouble and dollar import of commodity 
i = 1,2,...,n 
'ij use of domestic-import composite commodity 
i = 1,2,. ..,n in sector j = 1,2, ..., n,n+l 
ZitZirrZid total, rouble and dollar export of commodity i 
'n+ I total gross investments 
I total net investments at base price level 
Fie 1,Pir !Rid total, rouble and dollar noncompetitive import 
of commodity i = 1,2, ..., n 
- 
Mij use of noncompetitive import commodity 
i = 1,2, ..., n in sector j = 1,2, ..., n,n+l 
- 
Ci total private and public consun-ption of noncom- 
petitive import commodity i = 1,2, ..., n 
K capital used in sector j = 1,2, ..., n j 
L labor employed in sector j = 3,2, ..., n j 
S (opt imal )  u se r  c o s t  of l a b o r  and c a p i t a l  per  u n i t  j 
of ou tpu t  i n  s e c t o r  j = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n 
W use r  c o s t  of labor  i n  s e c t o r  j = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n j 
W n e t  r a t e  of r e t u r n  requirement ( t a x )  on l abor  
* j user  c o s t  of c a p i t a l  i n  s e c t o r  j = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n 
R n e t  r a t e  of r e t u r n  requirement ( t a x )  on c a p i t a l  
TI s h a r e  of roub le  import i n  t o t a l  noncompetit ive 
import  of commodity i = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n 
m i r  ' m i d  p ropor t ions  of compet i t ive  rouble  and d o l l a r  in- 
p o r t s  of commodity i = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n 
P domestic s e l l e r  p r i c e  of commodity j = 1 , 2 , . . , , n  j 
produced 
pE d o l l a r  expor t  p r i c e  of commodity j = 1 . 2 , .  . . , n  jd 
V,.Vd exchange rage of roubles  and d o l l a r s  
9' average domestic p r i c e  of noncompetit ive import  i 
of commodity i = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n 
P: average p r i c e  of domestic-import composite com- 
modity i = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n 
E t o t a l  consumption expendi ture  
EX excess  expendi ture  l e v e l  
C t o t a l  consumption a t  base p r i c e  l e v e l  
Zzogeneous Variables and Parameters 
s c a p i t a l  replacement r a t e  i n  s e c t o r  j  = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n j 
6 d e p r e c i a t i o n  r a t e  i n  s e c t o r  j = 1 , 2 ,  ..., n j 
K t o t a l  c a p i t a l  s tock  
L t o t a l  l abor  
E 
parameters i n  t h e  expor t  func t ions  
i r f  ' id  
xi, ai dollar export supply and demand elasticities in 
sector i = 1,2, ..., n 
WE pWE pWI pWI 
'id' ir' id' ir 
world market export and import prices of commodity 
P I  FWI i (rouble-dollar. competitive-noncompetitive import) 
id' ir I 
DdlDr target surplus or deficit on dollar and rouble 
foreign trade balance 
a input coefficient of domestic-import composite com- i j 
rnodity i = I,2, ..., n in sector j = 1,2, ..., n,n+l 
-0 
milpi parameters in the determination of the area com- 
position of the noncompetitive import of commod- 
ity i = 3,2,.,,,n 
parameters 
'irl'id 
in the import functions, 
- 
bilbi fixed (base) amount of total consumption of com- 
modity i = 1,2, ..., n 
- 
ci1ci fixed structure of excess consumption of commodity 
i = 1,2,.,,,n 
a real consumption-net investment ratio 
w wage coefficient in sector j = I,2, ..., n j 
B a l a n c i n g  E q u a t i o n s  
Intermediate Commodities 
Noncompetitive Imports 
Primary Factors 
Trade Balances 
T e c h n o  ZogicaZ C h o i c e  
Import and Export  Func t ions  
Noncompetitive Imports 
Competitive Imports 
'id 
id id 
Exports 
- Zi - Zir + Zid 
i = 7 , 2 ,  ..., n ( 1 8 )  
i = I . .  n ( 1 9 )  
where 
if export supply function 
if export demand function ( h i  3i/(h i + ail if export equilibrium function 
Fina l  Demand Equat ions  
P r i c e s  and C o s t s  
WE 
'id of expor t  supply s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
E - 
'id - ' ( 3 4 )  ( 1  "'i WE 
'id o therwise  
'id i = 1 , 2 , . . . , n  
P r i c e  norm? l i z a t i o n  r u l e  
The S p e c i f i c s  o f  t h e  Smal l  Mode2 
A s  mentioned i n  s e c t i o n  5 t h e  s m a l l  model i s  p a r t l y  s i m p l e r ,  
p a r t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  more d e t a i l e d  one. There a r e  only  t h r e e  
s e c t o r s ,  one f o r e i g n  t r a d e  a r e a ,  a l l  imports  a s  t r e a t e d  a s  com- 
p e t i t i v e .  These s i m p l i f i e d  assumptions i n d i c a t e  some p l a u s i b l e  
changes i n  t h e  above model s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  
One of t h e  m o r e i m p a r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s  i s  t h a t  w e  t r e a t  home 
produced and imported commodities a s  imper fec t  s u b s t i t u t e s .  There- 
f o r e  i n s t e a d  of equa t ions  1, 1 6 - 1 9 ,  and 3 3  w e  have t o  u s e  t h e  
fo l lowing  ones.  
Where sid and sim are the relative shares of home produced 
0 
and imported sources available for domestic use, sid and 
so their base values, respectively (see Appendix 1 for ex- 
Lm 
planation) . 
The other real difference stems from the assumed sub- 
stitutability of commodities in consumption. We have used 
an LES type of consumption demand system. Therefore, equation 
23 will be in this case as follows: 
